

**BENARESSANSKRITSERIES;**

A

COLLECTION OF SANSKRIT WORKS

EDITED BY THE

PANDITS OF THE BENARES SANSKRIT COLLEGE,

UNDER THE SUPERINTENDENCE OF

R. T. H. GRIFFITH M. A.,

DIRECTOR OF PUBLIC INSTRUCTION, N. W. P. & OUDH,

& G. THIBAUT PH. DR.,

PRINCIPAL, BENARES COLLEGE.

No. 4.

—\*—  
**। अर्थसङ्ग्रहः ।**

**THE ARTHASAMGRAHA**

AN ELEMENTARY TREATISE

ON MIMAMSA

BY

**LAUGÁKSHI BHÁSKARA,**

EDITED AND TRANSLATED

BY

**G. THIBAUT PHIL. DR.**

PRINCIPAL, BENARES

COLLEGE.

~~~~~  
**BENARES:**

**PUBLISHED BY MESSRS. BRAJ B. DAS & CO.**

PRINTED AT THE BENARES PRINTING PRESS.

1982.

Registered according to Act XXV. of 1867.

## PREFACE.

The treatise edited and translated in the following is one of the best known and most extensively studied of the elementary works on the Mīmāṃsā-śāstra. It closely follows—and in many passages literally agrees with—the equally popular Mīmāṃsā-Nyāya-Prakāśa usually called the Āpadevī, which latter work would perhaps be the most recommendable to the beginner of all treatises on Mīmāṃsā. The Artha-samgraha has however been preferred for publication in the Benares Sanskrit Series on account of its smaller bulk. Its text has been repeatedly published before, in a lithographed edition at Benares together with a commentary and in a printed edition brought out by Paṇḍit Jībānanda Vidyā-sāgar at Calcutta. Both these editions are incorrect, especially the latter one.

The Arthasamgraha is by no means an easy book, in spite of—or as it would perhaps be more correct to say, owing to—its limited bulk in which a great amount of matter is condensed by means of the most pregnant language being used. I am greatly obliged to Paṇḍit Dhundhi Rāja the able and learned Sanskrit Librarian of the Benares College for continued assistance given to me while editing and translating the Arthasamgraha and revising the proofsheets. With regard to some specially difficult points I have likewise been greatly benefitted by the advice of the distinguished Paṇḍit Bāla Śāstrī, late Professor of Law in the Benares Sanskrit-College who combines with a perfect mastery of the Śāstras a thorough knowledge of the Veda and therefore is entitled like few others to be appealed to in any question connected with the Mīmāṃsā-śāstra.—A mere literal translation would have been of comparatively small value; numerous explanations have therefore been added and the plan of inserting them into the text by means of brackets rather than adding them in footnotes has been by preference adhered to.

G. THIBAUT.

BENARES :  
March, 1882.

PK 3851  
- L 4 A 8  
1882



Comp. Phil.

## INTRODUCTORY REMARKS.

An attempt at an exhaustive review and criticism of the *Mīmāṃsā-śāstra* would be out of place here. A few remarks however on its general character will form a not unsuitable introduction to the *Artha-samgraha* and will, it is hoped, be of some use to those who wish to form an adequate idea of the subject matter of this hitherto some what neglected system. The only longer essay on *Mīmāṃsā* which exists—the one by Colebrooke—gives correct information as far as it goes, is however not well adapted to make the reader acquainted with the leading features of the *Śāstra*. The current accounts of the *Mīmāṃsā* found in handbooks &c. merely extract Colebrooke's remarks and are as a rule more or less vague and incorrect.

The beginnings of the *Mīmāṃsā* may be traced distinctly enough in the Veda itself, the very word (*mīmāṃsā*; *mīmāṃsate* &c.) being used there to denote doubt and discussion with regard to points of doctrine and ritual. This early *Mīmāṃsā* may be designated a *bonā fide* *Mīmāṃsā* as it tries to decide the points about which a doubt is raised by free reasoning taking into account the circumstances and exigencies of each case without submitting itself to any authority. It originated in the time when owing to differences in tradition, belief, ritual &c. the various Vedic *śākhās* began to form themselves, a time when the whole religious and sacrificial system of the Brahmins still was in a comparatively unsettled and floating condition.—The later systematical *Mīmāṃsā* on the other hand—the *Mīmāṃsā* which is embodied in the *śāstra*—is of a more limited scope, owing to the altered circumstances of the time in which it arose. The creative period of Brahminical religious thought was then past and the spirit of free inquiry and discussion had yielded to an implicit faith in the authority of the sacred books handed down by unbroken tradition. Difficulties with regard to questions of sacrifice and ritual still indeed presented themselves but they were not as of old difficulties arising from the nature of the things themselves and to be re-

moved by an independent and unbiassed consideration of all sides of the question, but rather difficulties originating in the peculiar nature of the sacred books and obstructing the procedure of any one who endeavoured to obey the injunctions contained in them. The character of the *brāhmaṇas*—that part of the Veda which more immediately concerns us here—is well known and there can be no doubt that any one attempting to carry out the precepts contained in them or—if we limit ourselves to the main point—to perform the sacrifices which they describe and comment on, would soon find himself assailed by numerous doubts and misgivings as to his actions being a faithful representation of what the sacred texts intimate. The description of the sacrifices contained in the *brāhmaṇas* is so incomplete and obscure, in the best cases so disjointed and unsystematic, so frequently interrupted by remarks and comments on the mystical signification of the sacrifice and its constituent acts that it would appear almost impossible for the sacrificer to feel assured of having done exactly what he ought to have done unless he had some other help to guide him. That such a help existed at a very early time already, I mean in the time immediately following on the composition of the chief *brāhmaṇas*, is a matter which does not admit of any doubt. We can not indeed confidently maintain that then already books of the nature of the *kalpa-sūtras* or *prayogas* existed, but at any rate there must have existed from the outset a full and circumstantial oral tradition referring to the proper performance of the sacrifices, a tradition for which we may even, from obvious reasons, claim a greater fulness and clearness the higher we ascend into antiquity.

We may thus assume that during a certain period consequent on the composition of the *brāhmaṇas*—of whatever length that period may have been—acts of religious duty, whereby are meant in the first place sacrifices, were performed on the double ground of the text of the Veda and of oral tradition, two sources of knowledge which we may suppose to have agreed tolerably well in all essential points. But this period was as we know followed by one in which a more systematical and critical spirit began to stir, a period in which the Brahmins felt the want of thoroughly reviewing and recasting all the knowledge they were then possessing, of proving



its soundness and validity by the best possible means and of embodying it in treatises as pregnant and concise as possible. I of course allude to the sūtra-period. One of the many tasks then presenting themselves was to raise the doctrine of the sacrificial performances on an incontrovertible basis. This was indeed a task for which the proper way of procedure was much more clearly defined than was the case with regard to most other departments of knowledge. By far the greater part of the Veda directly refers to the sacrifice and the object to be held in view was therefore to compose treatises describing the different sacrificial performances which should entirely base on the text of the Veda and against which no body appealing to the latter would be able to raise any objection. The difficulties besetting this undertaking originated, as remarked above, in the peculiar nature of the Vedic texts whose object, as is well known, is to point out the symbolical and mystical meaning of the single acts of the sacrifice, not to give a clear and connected description of the latter which the performer might follow with ease. It will suffice shortly to touch here on some few of the circumstances which rendered the task of the sūtra-writer a by no means easy one. It is f. i. observed that those chapters of the Veda which refer to one and the same sacrifice do not immediately follow on each other but are separated by intervening sections which treat of different matters. The fact that throughout the mantras accompanying a certain sacrifice are combined in separate sections apart from those chapters which contain the corresponding brāhmaṇa is in itself a source of frequent perplexity.—Again it often happens that there is an apparent contradiction between two passages referring to the same matter as when f. i. the brāhmaṇa-passage maintains that from out a series of sacrificial acts a certain one is to be performed in the sixth place while in the section which contains the mantras accompanying the series of acts the mantra referring to the particular act mentioned occupies the tenth place.—Or again we find that of two actions referring to the same thing the one which according to the exigencies of the case must be performed in the second place is in the sacred text enjoined before the other one.—Or again the reader of the Veda may be in doubt to whom a certain injunction contained in

the Veda is addressed, what kind of man, in other words, is entitled to perform the sacrifice enjoined and in return to expect the result promised in the Veda.—Or again we meet in the Veda with passages regarding which a *prima facie* doubt arises whether they enjoin an independent sacrifice to be performed from a special motive and attended by a special result or perhaps merely a subordinate sacrificial act which contributes its limited share towards the successful performance of one of the well known great sacrifices.—Or again—and this must have been a point whose consideration very frequently pressed itself on the Brahmins at a time when the various sacrifices mentioned in the Veda were in reality regularly performed—it becomes a matter for reflection and doubt in what manner one has to perform the very numerous so-called *vikritis* i. e. the sacrifices which are mere modifications of the few typical sacrifices and which as such the Veda does not describe in detail.—It would be useless here to continue the enumeration of difficult cases of this nature as the treatise edited and translated in the following pages offers many additional examples.

The continually recurring necessity of dealing with difficult cases of the kind described led to the elaboration of a set of rules under the guidance of which it became possible to give an account of the sacrifice which was of real use for practical purposes and which at the same time could be upheld in every particular as being founded on the Veda. So f. i.—to mention only the principles by means of which two of the above stated difficulties are to be solved—it is laid down that whenever the place of the mantra accompanying a certain action and the place assigned to the action by a brāhmaṇa-passage are in conflict the mantra is to have greater weight than the brāhmaṇa because the former being actually recited during the sacrifice is connected with it more intimately than the latter which is not directly used during the performance.—And of two actions referring to the same thing, as f. i. the husking of rice-grains and their cooking, the one to which the exigencies of the case assign the first place is to be done first although in the sacred text it may be mentioned only after the other one; on the general principle that we must try to find for every individual act constituting the sacrifice a visible purpose by means of

which it may contribute towards the outward form of the sacrifice and that only in the case of such a visible purpose not being traceable it may be assumed that the act directly contributes towards the supersensuous result of the entire sacrifice. In the example alluded to above the visible purpose of the ricegrains being husked first is that thereby they are made fit for being cooked while no such purpose can be discovered if the cooking is made to precede the husking.

The exposition of these rules either directly stated as in the systematical treatises of later origin or implied in the discussion of particular Vedic passages as in Jaimini's sūtras forms the bulk of what is called the Mīmāṃsā-sūtra and the latter might therefore broadly be defined as a body of rules enabling us to construct on the ground of the Veda a kalpa-sūtra or a prayoga (a treatise of the nature of the manuals called prayogas—either actually written down or else mentally conceived—forming the indispensable preliminary step for a kalpasūtra which is nothing but a prayoga highly abbreviated and condensed by means of certain technicalities and conventions). It would be a by no means uninteresting task to submit a kalpasūtra as f. i. Baudhāyana's or Āpastamba's to an investigation of this kind and to show f. i. by a comparison of the accounts given of some primary sacrifice in the Vedic texts on one hand and in the kalpasūtra on the other hand how the transition from the former to the latter can only be effected by certain rules of the Mīmāṃsā being had recourse to.

Although the remarks made in the preceding lines on the scope of the Mīmāṃsā sufficiently characterize the matter occupying the greater part of the sūtra and point out its chiefly practical character they by no means render full justice to the form in which the sūtra was finally elaborated and in which it appears in the systematical treatises a specimen of which is the Artha-samgraha. In this later form the Mīmāṃsā is a systematic analysis of that entire part of the Veda which refers to action, preeminently sacrificial action, of the so-called Karma-kāṇḍa. This part of the Veda comprises all Vedic writings with the only exception of the Upanishads, includes therefore the entire Samhitās and by far the greater part of the brāhmaṇas. The investigation undertaken by

the fully developed Mīmāṃsā has of course originated from the more practical questions above touched upon but it takes a wider scope and establishes a theory which may indeed be applied to the decision of practical questions but which in addition has its own independent interest. The chief features of this theory will be shortly indicated in the following.

The entire Veda (excluding the Upanishads) is declared to treat of dharma, i. e. acts of duty foremost among which are sacrifices. It in the first place enjoins certain acts of duty specifying at the same time the beneficial result which attends the performance of each act. If it be asked on what authority these acts are enjoined and certain results stated to belong to them, the answer is that the Veda as being nitya, eternal is authoritative of its own nature and needs no other basis to rest on. The proofs of the eternity of the Veda are of course by no means satisfactory and may if closely examined be reduced to the faith of the community basing on immemorial tradition. But this point really lies outside the scope of the Mīmāṃsā which rather presupposes the eternity of the Veda and consequently the binding nature of the precepts contained therein and enters on its real task when it begins to demonstrate that every part, in fact every line and every word of the sacred texts somehow or other refers to acts of duty incumbent on men. To do this it becomes necessary to classify the contents of the Veda. The most general classification is to distinguish the mantra-passages from the Brāhmaṇa-passages these two great divisions being clearly pointed out by their different form; the systematical books on Mīmāṃsā however as a rule start at once with the more detailed division of the Veda into injunctions (vidhi), mantras, names (nāmadheya), prohibitions (nishedha) and explanatory passages (arthavāda). Among these five divisions the first place in point of importance is claimed by the injunctions, vedic passages which—their character of eternity and authority being presupposed—impel man to perform a certain action in expectation of a certain result. As f. i. the passage "a man desirous of paradise is to sacrifice" (svargakāmo yajeta). Passages of this kind claim an instigatory character in consequence of their finite verb standing in the optative or imperative form, whereby the hearer or

reader is instigated to act. The difference between these optative forms as found in the Veda and those which are employed in ordinary human intercourse is that in the latter case the enunciation of the optative form originates in the mind of some individual person who has the wish of making another person act, while in the former case the instigatory power rests solely in the eternal word of the Veda which has no human mind for its antecedent. If we wish to bring the matter somewhat nearer to our way of thinking we might say that the optative forms of the Veda embody the eternal commands of God; although this would not exactly correspond to the doctrine of the Mīmāṃsakas to whom the Veda is a self-subsistent entity.

Among the numerous injunctions which are found in the Vedic texts we have in the first place to distinguish those which in the most general terms enjoin a certain action or sacrifice and to which all other injunctions referring to details are subordinate. Injunctions of this kind are called utpatti-vidhis i. e. originative injunctions and an example is f. i. "agnihotram juhōti" "he is to perform the agnihotra-oblation." The very limited number of short sentences embodying injunctions of this nature constitute to the Hindú mind the very kernel of the Veda all the remainder of which comprising among the rest the entire Samhitás has its *raison d'être* only in standing in a certain relation to the utpatti-vidhis and being useful to the person who endeavours to carry out the precepts contained in the latter. These utpatti-vidhis cannot be said to stand to each other in any necessary relation and—as far as known to me—the Mīmāṃsakas have made no attempt to subordinate them to some principle of unity. It can only be said that the order of the sacrifices enjoined in them is a definite one the sacrificer having to proceed in regular succession from the simpler ones to the more complicated. But even from this principle of unity the *naimittika* sacrifices i. e. those which have to be performed on special occasions arising would have to be excepted. Nor can a principle of unity be discovered in the results to which the sacrifices are said to lead, as these are of the most heterogeneous nature, long life, wealth, progeny, dominion or, as in many cases, paradise or the heavenly world (*svarga*). The latter is,

most probably on account of its indefiniteness, declared by the Mīmāṃsá to be the fruit of all those sacrifices for which the Veda does not mention a special result.

These originative injunctions impressing man's mind excite in him the desire to perform the action as the result of which the heavenly world or else some earthly possession is pointed out. The utpatti-vidhi itself as a rule intimates the result and in addition to this the general nature of the action by means of which the result is to be obtained, this action being in most cases a sacrifice; but in order to enable the person desirous to sacrifice to carry out his intention the special mode of procedure (the so-called *itikarta-vyatá*) remains to be stated. This is done by the second class of injunctions distinguished by the Mīmāṃsakas, the so called *vinīyoga-vidhis*, injunctions of application by means of which all the actions and things subsidiary to a certain sacrifice (the so called *aṅgas* or members of the sacrifice) are intimated. The injunctions belonging to this class are as they supply information about all the detail of the sacrifice very numerous and the discussion of the different principles according to which they are to be combined with each other and subordinated to the utpatti-vidhis is one of the most, practically perhaps the most important topic of the *mīmāṃsá*. The *pramāṇas* which are to guide us in subordinating the various objects and acts constituting the sacrifice to one another and finally to the central action are stated to be six, of successively decreasing force and it must be admitted that the reasoning by which the relative strength of these *pramāṇas* is settled shows extraordinary acuteness and an astonishing grasp of all the intricate and perplexing detail furnished by the Vedic texts. A full discussion of the matter will be found in the *Arthasamgraha*; here it must suffice to state a few cases exemplifying the general principles. Above was mentioned as an example of the utpatti-vidhi the passage "agnihotram juhōti" "he is to perform the agnihotra-oblation." With this injunction now we have to connect the *vinīyoga-vidhi* "dadhná juhōti" which as the Mīmāṃsakas explain, in reality means "dadhná homam bhāvayet" "he is to effect the oblation by means of sour milk." This passage shows us that sour milk is an *aṅga*, a subsidiary matter of the agnihotra-oblation and the special reason from



which we infer the stated relation is in the present case śruti i. e. direct statement or direct enunciation, the instrumental form "dadhna" showing directly that sour milk is the means by which the oblation is accomplished. This śruti is justly declared to be the strongest of all the proofs enabling us to infer the connection of subsidiary matter and principal matter; the one of widest application however and the one which must be applied at the outset when we wish to find the link connecting the entire sacrificial action with its constituent parts is prakaraṇa or interdependence i. e. the principle according to which we consider as referring to each other one passage which enjoins some sacrifice in general as leading to a certain result and another which enjoins some special act without naming a special result accruing from it. So f. i. when we read the passage enjoining the darśapūrṇamāsa-sacrifice "he who is desirous of paradise is to offer the darśapūrṇamāsa-sacrifice" we feel the want of other passages pointing out in what way the named sacrifice is to be performed and on the other hand when we meet with the passage referring to the oblations called samidh "he is to offer the samidh" we rest unsatisfied because we do not immediately see what is to be effected by means of the samidh. The consequence is that we become aware of the interdependence of these two injunctions, the particular action mentioned in the latter being subservient to the comprehensive sacrifice enjoined in the former one.

Again after we have by means of the viniyoga-vidhis understood the interior structure of the sacrifice and the successive subordination of its parts to the whole we require, in order to become able to perform the sacrifice, additional information about one point viz., the order in which the several parts have to succeed one another. This want is supplied by the so-called injunctions of performance, prayoga-vidhi. It is however to be remarked that we meet only in very rare cases with vedic passages having no other purpose than to settle the order of the acts constituting the sacrifice. In almost all cases this order of succession is to be concluded from the various indicia given in the viniyoga-vidhis, mantras &c. so that the prayoga-vidhis have rather an inferential than an actual existence. —Here again there are enumerated six means of proof of varying

force by means of which order of succession is determined. The translation of the Artha-samgraha will be found to give the requisite details.

There remains one class of injunctions to be noticed, viz. the so-called injunctions of claim or qualification, adhikāra-vidhi. The injunctions enumerated hitherto have taught us firstly what acts are to be done, secondly in what manner the acts enjoined are to be done and thirdly which is the order of succession of the subordinate acts the aggregate of which constitutes the principal act. There remains one question more to be answered viz. who is the person to whom all these different injunctions are addressed? who is qualified to perform the sacrifice enjoined and to claim its promised fruit? and this question is settled by the adhikāra-vidhis. About this class of injunctions too it is to be remarked that few passages only are mere adhikāra-vidhis it frequently happening that one and the same passage is utpatti-vidhi as well as adhikāra-vidhi. And again we must note that a great number of adhikāra-vidhis have a merely ideal existence, as certain qualifications of the sacrificer are nowhere explicitly enounced but have to be inferred from the requirements of the case.—So much about vidhi, injunction.

If we now turn to the second of the five divisions of the Veda, the mantras, the first question presenting itself is again "in what relation do they stand to the sacrificial action? in what manner do they help the latter?" The answer here is somewhat curious. As already remarked the Mīmāṃsakas are extremely anxious to show that every part of the sacrifice, every word and gesture are of visible use, contribute their share towards the proper accomplishment of the outwardly appearing set of actions as which the sacrifice presents itself to the senses and they insist on ascribing what we might call a purely ceremonial character, a significance of a purely spiritual and supersensuous nature to those actions only for which a visible purpose can not by any means be made out. The principle is on the whole certainly a sound one as its application tends to convert the sacrifice into a well connected whole the parts of which are subservient to each other, while the too free use of the contrary principle i. e. of ascribing an independent charac-

ter to each individual act would resolve the whole sacrifice into a string of performances of whom no body would understand how they came to be combined.—In the special case of the mantras however the former principle appears to be carried too far. If we consider the point impartially we can hardly deny that by far the greater part of the verses and short sayings which accompany the different acts of the sacrifice can only have been meant to have a mystical, supersensuous effect, to contribute directly towards the transcendental result, the *apūrva*, which in a manner unknown to man is produced by the sacrifice and is the means of procuring for the sacrificer his reward. The *Mīmāṃsakas* however maintain that while some mantras must be acknowledged merely to have the effect stated just now the great majority of them have the purpose of reminding the sacrificer of the different matters connected with the sacrifice, f. i. of the divinities to whom the various oblations are made. It is clear that the first position is here unduly assigned to a circumstance which is altogether secondary and accidental.

While it is easy to understand why injunction (*vidhi*) and mantra are declared to constitute two of the subdivisions of the *veda* and again why the same position is assigned to *arthavāda* and *nishedha*, it is, on a superficial view of the matter, difficult to see why *nāmadheya*, name is coordinated with the four heads enumerated. The distinction of these four heads bases on the obvious circumstance that the many particular sentences constituting in their totality the "*apaurusheyam vākyaṃ*" called *Veda* show peculiar characteristics naturally leading to the establishment of a fourfold division. The head "*nāmadheya*" on the other hand does not comprise entire sentences, but only particular words occurring in the *vidhi*-passages. The question of *nāmadheya* is in the *Mīmāṃsā* regularly treated in connection with four different Vedic passages viz. "*udbhidā yajeta paśukāmaḥ*" "*chitrāyā yajeta paśukāmaḥ*" "*agnihotram juhoti*" "*śyenenābhicharan yajeta*" and it might thus appear as if the quoted passages alone had given rise to the discussion. This is however by no means the case; every passage which contains the name of a sacrifice is equally implicated in the investigation and three at any rate of the four quoted in-

junctions appear to owe their selection merely to the circumstance of the sacrifices enjoined in them being comparatively little known or practised so that it was in addition to the theoretical value of the question a matter of some practical interest to decide what the terms "*udbhidā*" &c. really denoted. Passages enjoining well known sacrifices—as f. i. "*darśapūrṇamāsābhyām yajeta*" "*jyotiṣṭomena yajeta*"—might however as well be used as examples.—The reason now why in all such passages particular words like "*udbhidā*" "*darśapūrṇamāsābhyām*" are singled out as belonging to a special subdivision of the *Veda* is as follows. According to the theory repeatedly alluded to in the above all the parts of the *Veda* must be shown to be connected with the action or energy (the so called *ārtihī bhāvanā*) roused in the believer by the injunctive passages. This energy requires a result towards which it tends, an instrument whereby to realize the result and the indication of the particular way of procedure. The last named demand is satisfied by the many subsidiary injunctions, as stated above. The instrument is implicitly mentioned in the *utpattividhis* and is in fact the sacrifice itself, the verb "*yajeta*" having to be interpreted as meaning "*yāgena bhāvayet*" "he is to effect or realize by means of the sacrifice", the object to be effected being the result of the sacrifice. If we therefore transform the first of the above quoted passages in the same manner we get the following sentence "*udbhidā yāgena paśum bhāvayet*", in which the word "*paśum*" indicates the result while "*yāgena*" denotes the instrument. Thus—various hypotheses on which the word "*udbhidā*" might be put in connection with the *bhāvanā* having been disproved—there remains no other course but to declare that it merely serves to define or to limit the idea expressed by the word "*yāgena*", is merely a name and as such occupies a position by itself, which entitles it to be considered as belonging to a special subdivision of the Vedic texts. The same reasoning applies to the other passages quoted.—I feel not quite sure whether this subtle distinction is really defensible or necessary but at any rate it is a striking proof of the thoroughness with which the *Mīmāṃsakas* have carried out their analysis of the *Veda*.

The fourth subdivision of the *Veda*, viz. *nishedha*, prohibition may be left undiscussed here, as its subject matter is not of prima-



ry importance. It is of course intimately connected with vidhi, injunction (many nishedhas being in fact only disguised vidhis) and it is therefore unnecessary to dwell on the position it occupies in the Veda.

Arthaváda, explanatory statement forms the last of the five subdivisions of the Veda adopted by the Mímámsá. The translation of arthaváda by "explanatory statement" is not quite adequate, as arthaváda is defined as comprising all those sentences which either contain a praise of the things enjoined (by vidhi) or a blame of the things prohibited (by nishedha). These passages can not be maintained to be directly connected with the above mentioned árhí bhávaná, as the whole action enjoined by vidhi is carried out without any help from the arthaváda sentences, but they occupy a definite position with regard to the so-called śábdí bhávaná, i. e. the energy inherent in vidhi-passages by which the latter are able to impress man's mind and make him act. For the special mode in which the śábdí bhávaná acts (its itikartavyatá) is expressed in the arthaváda-passages, man being on one hand impelled to perform an action when he hears it praised and glorified and on the other hand feeling disinclined to do things which others reprehend and object to.

It is thereby shown that every part of the Veda somehow or other contributes towards dharma and the task of the Mímámsá is thus fulfilled. It will at the same time appear that a theoretical inquiry of this kind into the nature of the Veda satisfies all practical requirements as well; for if the logical connection in which the sentences of the Veda stand to each other is understood the proper way of procedure for him who wishes to act on the precepts of the Veda can no longer be doubtful.

The above remarks have left many interesting points unnoticed, so f. i. the doctrine of the eternity of sound, the doctrine of the different pramáṇas &c. A more detailed account of the system I hope to publish in another place. The Mímámsá certainly deserves greater attention than it has hitherto received. It has indeed none of the attractions which the other darśanas derive from the speculative character of their contents; its scope is limited and the nature of the investigations in which it is engaged

leaves no room for high flights of the imagination. But it possesses counterbalancing advantages. Its subject matter is of a positive nature, its method is sound and its reasoning in most cases convincing.

## अर्थसङ्ग्रहः ।

श्रीगणेशाय नमः ।

वासुदेवं रमाकान्तं नत्वा लौगाशिभास्करः ।

कुरुते जैमिनिनये प्रवेशायार्थसंग्रहम् ॥ १ ॥

अथ परमकारुणिको भगवान् जैमिनिर्धर्मविवेकाय द्वाद-  
शलक्षणीं प्रणिनाय । तत्रादौ धर्मजिज्ञासां सूत्रयामास अथा-  
तो धर्मजिज्ञासेति । अत्रायशब्दो वेदाध्ययनानन्तर्यवचनः ।  
अतःशब्दो हि वेदाध्ययनस्य दृष्टार्थत्वं ब्रूते । स्वाध्यायो ऽध्येतव्य  
इत्यध्ययनविधौ । तदध्ययनस्यार्थज्ञानरूपदृष्टार्थकत्वेन व्यवस्था-  
पनात् । तथा च वेदाध्ययनानन्तरं यतो ऽर्थज्ञानरूपदृष्टार्थकं  
तदध्ययनमतो हेतोर्धर्मस्य वेदार्थस्य जिज्ञासा कर्तव्येति शेषः ।  
जिज्ञासापदस्य विचारे लक्षणा । अतो धर्मविचारं शास्त्रमिद-  
मारम्भणीयमिति शास्त्रारम्भसूत्रार्थः ॥ १ ॥

अथ को धर्मः किं तस्य लक्षणमिति चेदुच्यते । यागादिरेव  
धर्मः । तल्लक्षणं वेदप्रतिपाद्यः प्रयोजनवदर्थो धर्म इति । प्रयो-  
जने ऽतिव्याप्तिवारणाय प्रयोजनवदिति । भोजनादावतिव्याप्ति-  
वारणाय वेदप्रतिपाद्य इति । अनर्थफलकत्वादनर्थभूते श्येना-  
दावतिव्याप्तिवारणायार्थ इति । न च चोदनालक्षणो ऽर्थो धर्म  
इति सौत्रतल्लक्षणविरोधः चोदनापदस्य विधिरूपवेदैकदेश-  
परत्वादिति वाच्यम् । तत्रापि चोदनाशब्दस्य वेदमात्रपरत्वात् ।  
वेदस्य सर्वस्य धर्मतात्यर्थवत्त्वेन धर्मप्रतिपादकत्वात् ॥

स च यागादिर्यजेत स्वर्गकाम इत्यादिवाक्येन स्वर्गमुद्दिश्य पुरुषं प्रति विधीयते। तथा हि। यजेतेत्यत्राख्यं श्रद्धयं यजिधातुः प्रत्ययश्च। प्रत्यये ऽप्यख्यं श्रद्धयमाख्यातत्वं लिङ्त्वं च। तत्राख्यातत्वं दशलकारसाधारणं लिङ्त्वं पुनर्लिङ्मात्रे। उभाभ्यामप्यंशाभ्यां भावनैवोच्यते। भावना नाम भवितुर्भवनानुकूलो भावयितुर्व्यापारविशेषः। सा द्विधा (१) शाब्दी भावना आर्थो (२) भावना चेति। तत्र पुरुषप्रवृत्त्यनुकूलो भावयितुर्व्यापारविशेषः शाब्दी भावना। सा च लिङ्शेनोच्यते। लिङ्श्रवणे ऽयं मां प्रवर्तयति मत्प्रवृत्त्यनुकूलव्यापारवानिति नियमेन प्रतीतेः। यद्यस्माच्छब्दान्नियमतः प्रतीयते तत्तस्य वाच्यम्। यथा गामानयेत्यस्मिन्वाक्ये गोशब्दस्य गोत्वम्। स च व्यापारविशेषो लौकिकवाक्ये पुरुषनिष्ठो ऽभिप्रायविशेषः। वैदिकवाक्ये तु पुरुषाभावास्तिङादिशब्दनिष्ठ एव। अत एव शाब्दी भावनेति व्यवह्रियते। सा च भावनांशत्रयमपेक्षते साध्यं साधनमिति कर्तव्यतां च किं भावयेत्केन भावयेत्कथं भावयेदिति। तत्र साध्याकाङ्क्षायां वक्ष्यमाणांशत्रयोपेता आर्थी भावना साध्यत्वेनान्वेति। एकप्रत्ययगम्यत्वेन समानाभिधानश्रुतेः। संख्यादीनामेकप्रत्ययगम्यत्वे ऽप्ययोग्यत्वान्न साध्यत्वेनान्वयः। साधनाकाङ्क्षायां लिङादिज्ञानं करणत्वेनान्वेति। तस्य च करणत्वं (३) न भावनोत्पादकत्वेन तत्पूर्वमपि तस्याः शब्दे सत्त्वा-

(१) स ग पुस्तकयोः द्विविधा।

(२) स घ पुस्तकयोः शब्दभावना अर्थभा०।

(३) तस्य च भावनायां करणत्वमिति पाठः स पुस्तके।

त्। किं तु भावनाज्ञापकत्वेन शब्दभावनाभाव्यनिर्वर्तकत्वेन वा। इतिकर्तव्यताकाङ्क्षायांमर्थवादज्ञाप्यप्राशस्त्यमितिकर्तव्यतात्वेनान्वेति। प्रयोजनेच्छाजनितक्रियाविषयव्यापार आर्थी भावना। सा चाख्यातत्वांशेनोच्यते। आख्यातसामान्यस्य व्यापारवाचित्वात्। साध्यंशत्रयमपेक्षते साध्यं साधनमिति कर्तव्यतां च किं भावयेत्केन भावयेत्कथं भावयेदिति। तत्र साध्याकाङ्क्षायां स्वर्गादि फलं साध्यत्वेनान्वेति। साधनाकाङ्क्षायां यागादिः करणत्वेनान्वेति। इतिकर्तव्यताकाङ्क्षायां प्रयाजाद्यङ्गजातमितिकर्तव्यतात्वेनान्वेति॥

अथ को वेद इति चेदुच्यते। अपौरुषेयं वाक्यं वेदः। स च विधिमन्त्रनामधेयनिषेधार्थवादभेदात्पञ्चविधः॥

तत्राज्ञातार्थज्ञापको वेदभागो विधिः। स च तादृश (१) प्रयोजनवदर्थविधानेनार्थवान् यादृशं चार्थं प्रमाणान्तरेणाप्राप्तं विधत्ते। यथा ऽग्निहोत्रं जुहुयात्स्वर्गकाम इति विधिर्मानान्तरेणाप्राप्तं स्वर्गप्रयोजनवद्दोमं विधत्ते। अग्निहोत्रहोमेन स्वर्गं भावयेदिति वाक्यार्थबोधः। यत्र कर्म मानान्तरेण प्राप्तं तत्र तदुद्देशेन गुणमात्रं विधत्ते। यथा दध्ना जुहोतीत्यत्र होमस्याग्निहोत्रं जुहुयादित्यनेन प्राप्तत्वाद्दोमोद्देशेन दधिमात्रविधानम्। दध्ना होमं भावयेदिति। यत्र त्वभयमप्राप्तं तत्र विशिष्टं विधत्ते यथा सोमेन यजेतेत्यत्र सोमयागयोरप्राप्तत्वात्सोमविशिष्टयागविधानम्। सोमपदे मत्त्वर्थलक्षणया सोमवता यागेनेष्टं भावयेदिति वाक्यार्थबोधः। न चोभयविधाने वाक्यभेदः। प्रत्येकमुभय-

(१) स च प्रयोजनेति पाठः स ग पुस्तकयोः।



स्याविधानात् किं तु विशिष्टस्यैकस्यैव विधानात् । न च “ज्यो-  
तिष्टोमेन स्वर्गकामो यजेते”ति विधिप्राप्तयागोद्देशेन सोमरू-  
पगुणविधानमेवास्तु सोमेन यागं भावयेदिति किं मत्त्वर्थलक्षण-  
येति वाच्यम् । तस्याधिकारविधित्वेनोत्पत्तिविधित्वासंभवात् ।  
ननु द्विदा यजेत पशुकाम इत्यस्येव ज्योतिष्टोमेनेत्यस्याप्युत्पत्त्य-  
धिकारविधित्वमस्त्विति चेन्न । दृष्टान्तउत्पत्तिवाक्यान्तराभा-  
वेन अन्यथानुपपत्त्या तथात्वाश्रयणात् । किं च ज्योतिष्टोमेनेत्य-  
स्योभयविधित्वे ऽनेनैव यागस्तस्य फलसंबन्धो ऽपि बोधनीय  
इति सुदृढो वाक्यभेदस्तद्वरं सोमपदे मत्त्वर्थलक्षणया विशि-  
ष्टविधानम् ॥

विधिसुतुविधः । उत्पत्तिविधिर्विनियोगविधिरधिकारविधिः  
प्रयोगविधिश्चेति ॥

तत्र कर्मस्वरूपमात्रबोधको विधिरुत्पत्तिविधिः । यथा ऽग्नि-  
होत्रं जुहोतीति । अत्र विधौ कर्मणः करणत्वेनान्वयः । अग्नि-  
होत्रहोमेनेष्टं भावयेदिति । ननु यागस्य द्वे रूपे द्रव्यं देवता च ।  
तथा च रूपाश्रवणे अग्निहोत्रं जुहोतीति कथमुत्पत्तिविधिः ।  
अग्निहोत्रशब्दस्य तु तत्प्रत्ययन्यायेन नामधेयत्वादिति चेन्न ।  
रूपाश्रवणे ऽप्यस्योत्पत्तिविधित्वात् । अन्यथा रूपश्रवणाद्ब्रह्मा  
जुहोतीत्ययमेवोत्पत्तिविधिः स्यात् । तथा चाग्निहोत्रं जुहोती-  
ति वाक्यमनर्थकं स्यात् ॥

अङ्गप्रधानसंबन्धबोधको विधिर्विनियोगविधिः । यथा दध्ना  
जुहोतीति । स हि तृतीयया प्रतिपन्नाङ्गभावस्य दध्नो होमसं-  
बन्धं विधत्ते । दध्ना होमं भावयेदिति । गुणविधौ च धात्वर्थस्य

साध्यत्वेनान्वयः । कचिदाश्रयत्वेनापि । यथा दध्नेन्द्रियकामस्य  
जुहुयादित्यत्र दधिकरणत्वेनेन्द्रियं भावयेत् । तच्च किं निष्ठमि-  
त्याकाङ्क्षायां सन्निधिप्राप्तहोम आश्रयत्वेनान्वेति ॥

एतस्य विधेः सहकारिभूतानि षट् प्रमाणानि । श्रुतिलिङ्गवा-  
क्यप्रकरणस्थानसमाख्यारूपाणि । एतत्सहकृतेनानेन विधिना-  
ङ्गत्वं परोद्देशप्रवृत्तकृतिसाध्यत्वरूपं (१) पारार्थ्यापरपार्थ्यायं  
ज्ञाप्यते ॥

तत्र निरपेक्षो रवः श्रुतिः । सा च त्रिविधा । विधानी अभि-  
धानी विनियोक्त्री च । तत्राद्या लिङाद्यात्मिका । द्वितीया ब्री-  
ह्यादिश्रुतिः । यस्य च शब्दस्य श्रवणादेव संबन्धः प्रतीयते सा  
विनियोक्त्री । सापि त्रिविधा विभक्तिरूपा एकाभिधानरूपा  
एकपदरूपा चेति । तत्र विभक्तिश्रुत्या अङ्गत्वम् । यथा ब्रीहिभि-  
र्यजेतेति तृतीयाश्रुत्या ब्रीह्यीणां यागाङ्गत्वम् । तदपि पुरोडा-  
शप्रकृतितया । यथा पशोर्हृदयादिरूपहविष्प्रकृतितया यागा-  
ङ्गत्वम् । अरूणया एकहायन्या गवा सोमं क्रीणातीत्यस्मिन्  
वाक्ये आरूण्यस्यापि तृतीयाश्रुत्या क्रयाङ्गत्वम् । तदपि गोरूप-  
द्रव्यपरिच्छेदद्वारा न तु साक्षात् । अमूर्त्तत्वात् । ब्रीह्यीन्द्रोक्षती-  
ति प्रोक्षणस्य ब्रीह्यङ्गत्वं द्वितीयाश्रुत्या । तच्च प्रोक्षणं न ब्री-  
हिस्वरूपार्थम् । तस्य तेन विनाप्युपपत्तेः । किं त्वपूर्वसाधनत्व-  
प्रयुक्तम् । ब्रीह्यीन्द्रोक्ष्य यागानुष्ठाने ऽपूर्वानुपपत्तेः । एवं सर्वे-  
ष्वङ्गेष्वपूर्वप्रयुक्तमङ्गत्वं बोध्यम् । एवमिमामगृभ्णन्नशनामृतस्ये-  
त्यश्वाभिधानोमादत्तइत्यत्र द्वितीयया श्रुत्या मन्त्रस्याश्वाभि-

धान्यङ्गत्वम् । यदाहवनीये जुहोतीत्याहवनीयस्य होमाङ्गत्वं  
सप्तमीश्रुत्या । एवमन्योऽपि विभक्तिश्रुत्या विनियोगो ज्ञेयः । प-  
शुना यजेतेत्यत्रैकत्वपुंस्त्वयोः समानाभिधानश्रुत्या कारकाङ्ग-  
त्वम् । यजेतेत्याख्याताभिहितसंख्याया आर्थभावनाङ्गत्वं (१)  
समानाभिधानश्रुतेरेक (२) पदश्रुत्या च यागाङ्गत्वम् । न चामू-  
र्त्तायास्तस्याः कथं भावनाङ्गत्वं वाच्यम् । कर्त्तृपरिच्छेदद्वारा त-  
दुपपत्तेः । कर्त्ता चाक्षेपलभ्यः । आख्यातेन हि भावनोच्यते ।  
सा च कर्त्तारं विनानुपपन्नेति तमाक्षिपति । सेयं श्रुतिर्लिङ्गा-  
दिभ्यः प्रवृत्ता । लिङ्गादिषु न प्रत्यशो विनियोजकः शब्दोऽस्ति  
किं तु कल्पो, यावच्च तैर्विनियोजकः (३) कल्प्यते तावत्प्रत्य-  
क्षया श्रुत्या विनियोगस्य कृतत्वेन तेषां कल्पकत्वशक्तैर्वाह-  
तत्वात् । अत एवेन्द्रा लिङ्गाच्चेन्द्रोपस्थानार्थत्वम् । किं तु ऐ-  
न्द्रा गार्हपत्यमुपतिष्ठतइत्यत्र गार्हपत्यमिति द्वितीयाश्रुत्या  
गार्हपत्योपस्थानार्थत्वम् ॥

शब्दसामर्थ्यं लिङ्गम् । यथाङ्गः । सामर्थ्यं सर्वशब्दानां लिङ्ग-  
मित्यभिधीयते । सामर्थ्यं रूढिरेव । तेन समाख्यातो नाभेदः ।  
यौगिकशब्दसमाख्यातो रूढ्यात्मकलिङ्गशब्दस्य भिन्नत्वात् ।  
(४) तेन बर्हिर्देवसदनं दामीति मन्त्रस्य कुशलवनाङ्गत्वं न  
तलपादिलवनाङ्गत्वम् । तस्य बर्हिर्दामीतिलिङ्गात्तलवनं प्रका-

(१) संख्याया आर्थभावना इति पाठः क पुस्तके ।

(२) श्रुतेरेव । पदश्रुतेति पाठः स ग घ पुस्तकेषु ।

(३) कः शब्द इति ग घ पुस्तकयोः ।

(४) यौगिकेत्यारभ्य भिन्नत्वादित्यन्तो ग्रन्थः स ग पुस्तकयोर्नोपलभ्यते ।

शयितुं समर्थत्वात् । एवमन्यत्रापि लिङ्गादिनियोगो द्रष्टव्यः ।  
तदिदं लिङ्गं वाक्यादिभ्यो बलवत् । अत एव स्थोनं ते सदनं  
कृणोमीति मन्त्रस्य पुरोडाशसदनकरणाङ्गत्वं । सदनं कृणो-  
मीति लिङ्गान् न तु वाक्यात् ॥

समभिव्याहारो वाक्यम् । समभिव्याहारश्च साध्यत्वादिवाच-  
कद्वितीयाद्यभावेऽपि वस्तुतः शेषशेषिवाचकपदयोः सहोच्चा-  
रणम् । यथा यस्य पर्णमयी जुहूर्भवति न स पापं श्लोकं शृणो-  
तीत्यत्र पर्णताजुह्वोः समभिव्याहारादेव पर्णताया जुह्वङ्गत्वम् ।  
न चानर्थक्यम्, अन्यथापि जुह्वाः सिद्धत्वादिति वाच्यम् । जुह्व-  
शब्देन तत्साध्यापूर्वलक्षणात् । तथा च वाक्यार्थः । पर्णतया ऽव-  
त्तहविर्धारणद्वारा जुह्वपूर्वं भावयेदिति । एवं च पर्णतया यदि  
जुह्वः क्रियते तदैव तत्साध्यमपूर्वं भवति नान्यथेति गम्यतइति  
न पर्णताया वैयर्थ्यम् (१) । अवत्तहविर्धारणद्वारेति चावश्यं  
वक्तव्यम् । अन्यथा सुवादिव्यपि पर्णतापत्तेः । सेयं पर्णता अ-  
नारभ्याधीतापि सर्वप्रकृतिष्वेवान्वेति न विकृतिषु । तत्र चोद-  
केनापि तत्प्राप्तिसंभवात्पौनरुक्त्यापत्तेः । यत्र समग्राङ्गोपदेशः  
सा प्रकृतिः । यथा दर्शपूर्णमासादिः । तत्प्रकरणे सर्वाङ्गपाठात् ।  
यत्र न सर्वाङ्गोपदेशः सा विकृतिः । यथा सौर्यादिः । तत्र  
कतिपयाङ्गानामतिदेशेन प्राप्तत्वात् । अनारभ्यविधिः समान्य-  
विधिः । तदिदं वाक्यं प्रकरणादिभ्यो बलवत् । अत एवेन्द्राग्नी  
इदं हविरित्यादेरेकवाक्यत्वाद्दर्शाङ्गत्वं न तु प्रकरणाद्दर्शपूर्ण-  
मासाङ्गत्वम् ॥

(१) एवं चेत्यारभ्य वैयर्थ्यमित्यन्तः पाठो घ पुस्तके उपलभ्यते ।

उभयाकाङ्क्षा प्रकरणम् । यथा प्रयाजादिषु समिधो यजती-  
त्यादौ वाक्ये फलविशेषस्यानिर्देशात् समिध्यागेन भावयेदिति  
बोधानन्तरं किमिति उपकार्याकाङ्क्षा । दर्शपूर्णमासवाक्येऽपि  
दर्शपूर्णमासाभ्यां स्वर्गं भावयेदिति बोधानन्तरं कथमित्युपका-  
रकाकाङ्क्षा । इत्थं चोभयाकाङ्क्षया प्रयाजादीनां दर्शपूर्णमासा-  
ङ्गत्वम् । तच्च प्रकरणं द्विविधम् । महाप्रकरणमवान्तरप्रकरणं  
चेति । मुख्यभावनासंबन्धिप्रकरणं महाप्रकरणम् । तेन च प्रया-  
जादीनां दर्शपूर्णमासाङ्गत्वम् । एतच्च प्रकृतावेव, उभयाकाङ्क्षा-  
याः संभवान्न तु विकृतौ । तत्र प्रकृतिवद्विकृतिः कर्त्तव्येत्यति-  
देशेन कथंभावाकाङ्क्षाया उपश्रमेनापूर्वाङ्गानामप्युभयाकाङ्क्ष-  
या विनियोगासम्भवात् । तस्मादपूर्वाङ्गानां स्थानादेव विकृत्यर्थ-  
त्वमिति । अङ्गभावनासंबन्धिप्रकरणमवान्तरप्रकरणम् । तेन  
चाभिक्रमणादीनां प्रयाजाद्यङ्गत्वम् । तच्च सन्दर्शनेनैव ज्ञायते ।  
तदभावे चाविशेषात्सर्वेषां फलभावनाकथंभावेन ग्रहणप्रस-  
ङ्गेन प्रधानाङ्गत्वापत्तेः । एकाङ्गानुवादेन विधीयमानयोरप्य-  
ङ्गयोरन्तराले विहितत्वं सन्दर्शः । यथाऽभिक्रमणे । तत्र हि  
“समानयत उपभृतस्तेजो वा” इत्यादिना प्रयाजानुवादेन किं  
चिदङ्गं विधाय तदनन्तरमपि प्रयाजानुवादेन (१) “यस्यैवं (२)  
विदुषः प्रयाजा इज्यन्ते प्रैभ्यो लोकेभ्यो भ्रातृव्यानुदतेऽभि-  
क्रामं जुहोत्यभिजित्यै” इत्यनन्तरं “यो वै प्रयाजानां मिथुनं  
वेदे” इत्यादि किं चिदङ्गं विधीयते ॥

(१) यस्यैवंविदुष इत्यारभ्य तरमित्यन्तो ग्रन्थो ग पुस्तके नोपलभ्यते ।

(२) प्रयाजानुवादेन प्रयाजत्वं यस्यैवमिति पाठो ग पुस्तके ।

अतः प्रयाजाङ्गमध्येऽभिहितमभिक्रमणं तदङ्गम् । प्रयाजै-  
रपूर्वं कृत्वा यागोपकारं भावयेदिति ज्ञाते कथमेभिरपूर्वं क-  
र्त्तव्यमिति कथंभावाकाङ्क्षायाः सत्त्वात् । सा च सन्दर्शपठितैर-  
भिक्रमणादिभिः श्राम्यति । न चाङ्गभावनायां कथंभावाकाङ्क्षा-  
भावः । भावनासाम्येन तत्रापि तत्संभवात् । तदिदं (१) प्रक-  
रणं क्रियाया एव साक्षाद्विनियोजकं द्रव्यगुणयोस्तु तद्वारा ।  
तथा हि । यजेत स्वर्गकाम इत्यत्र फलभावनायां कथंभावाका-  
ङ्क्षायां सन्निधिपठिताश्रूयमाणफलकं क्रियाजातमुपकार्याका-  
ङ्क्षयेतिकर्त्तव्यतात्वेनान्वेति । क्रियाया एव लोके कथंभावा-  
काङ्क्षायामन्वयदर्शनात् । न हि हस्तेन (२) कुठारेण किञ्चादि-  
त्यत्र कथंभावाकाङ्क्षायामुच्चार्यमाणोऽपि हस्तोऽन्वेति किं  
तु हस्तेनोद्यम्य निपात्येति उद्यमननिपातने एव । हस्तश्च त-  
द्धारैवान्वेतीति सार्वजनीनमेतत् । इदं च स्थानादिभ्यो बल-  
वत् । अत एवाक्षैर्दीव्यति राजन्यमिति देवनादयो (३) धर्मा  
अभिषेचनीयसन्निधौ पठिता अपि स्थानान्न तदङ्गं किं तु प्रक-  
रणाद्राजसूयाङ्गमिति ॥

देशसामान्यं स्थानम् । तद्विविधम् । पाठसादेश्यमनुष्ठानसा-  
देश्यं चेति । स्थानं क्रमश्चेत्यनर्थान्तरम् । पाठसादेश्यमपि द्वि-  
विधम् । यथासंख्यपाठः सन्निधिपाठश्चेति । तत्रैन्द्राग्रमेकादश-  
कपालं निर्वपेद् वैश्वानरं द्वादशकपालं निर्वपेदित्येवंक्रमविहि-  
तेषु इन्द्राग्नी रोचना दिव इत्यादीनां याज्यानुवाक्यामन्त्रा-

(१) यदिदमिति पाठो “ग च” पुस्तकयोः ।

(२) हस्तकुठारेणेति पाठः क पुस्तके । न हि कुठारेणेति घ च पुस्तकयोः ।

(३) विदेवनादय इति पाठः ख ग च पुस्तकेषु टीकायां च ।



णां यथासंख्यं प्रथमस्य प्रथमं द्वितीयस्य द्वितीयमित्येवंरूपो विनियोगो यथासंख्यपाठात् । प्रथमपठितमन्त्रस्य हि कैमर्थ्याकाङ्क्षायां प्रथमतो विहितं कर्मैव प्रथममुपतिष्ठते समानदेशत्वात् । एवं द्वितीयमन्त्रस्यापि । वैकृताङ्गानां प्राकृताङ्गानुवादेन विहितानां संदंशपतितानां विकृत्यर्थत्वं सन्निधिपाठात् । यथा आमनहोमानाम् । तेषां हि कैमर्थ्याकाङ्क्षायां फलं विकृत्यपूर्वमेव भाव्यत्वेन संबध्यते उपस्थितत्वात् । स्वतन्त्रफलकत्वे विकृतिसन्निधिपाठानर्थक्यापत्तेः । पशुधर्माणामग्नीषोमीयार्थत्वमनुष्ठानसादेश्यात् । औपवसष्टये ऽङ्गि अग्नीषोमीयः पशुरनुष्ठीयते तस्मिन्नेव दिने ते धर्माः पठ्यन्ते । अतस्तेषां कैमर्थ्याकाङ्क्षायामनुष्ठेयत्वेनोपस्थितं पञ्चपूर्वमेव भाव्यत्वेन संबध्यते । तच्च स्थानं समाख्यातः प्रबलम् । अत एव शुन्धनमन्त्रः सान्नाय्यपात्राङ्गं पाठसादेश्यात् । न तु पौरोडाशिकमिति समाख्यया पुरोडाशमात्राङ्गम् ॥

समाख्या यौगिकः शब्दः । सा च द्विविधा वैदिकी लौकिकी च । तत्र होतुश्चमसभक्षणाङ्गत्वं होतृचमस इति वैदिकसमाख्यया । अध्वर्योस्तत्तत्पदार्थाङ्गत्वं लौकिक्या आध्वर्यवमिति समाख्ययेति सङ्केपः ॥

तदेवं निरूपितानि सङ्केपतः श्रुत्यादीनि षट् प्रमाणानि एतत्सङ्कृतेन विनियोगविधिना समिदादिभिरूपकृत्य दर्शपूर्णमासाभ्यां यजेतेत्येवंरूपेण यानि नियोज्यन्ते तान्यङ्गानि द्विविधानि सिद्धरूपाणि (१) क्रियारूपाणि चेति । तत्र सिद्धानि

(१) सिद्धानि इति पाठः “स ग च” पुस्तकेषु ।

जातिद्रव्यसंख्यादीनि तानि च दृष्टार्थान्येव । क्रियारूपाणि च द्विविधानि गुणकर्माणि प्रधानकर्माणि च एतान्येव सन्निपत्योपकारकाणि आरादुपकारकाणि चोच्यन्ते । कर्माङ्गद्रव्याद्युद्देशेन विधीयमानं कर्म सन्निपत्योपकारकम् । यथा ऽवघातप्रोक्षणादि तच्च दृष्टार्थमदृष्टार्थं दृष्टादृष्टार्थं चेति । तत्र दृष्टार्थमवघातादि । अदृष्टार्थं प्रोक्षणादि । दृष्टादृष्टार्थं पशुपुरोडाशादि । तद्वि द्रव्यत्यागांशेनैव अदृष्टं देवतोद्देशेन च देवतास्मरणं दृष्टं करोति । द्रव्याद्यनुद्दिश्य केवलं विधीयमानं कर्म आरादुपकारकम् । यथा प्रयाजादि । आरादुपकारकं च (१) परमापूर्वोत्पत्तावेवोपयुज्यते । सन्निपत्योपकारकं तु द्रव्यदेवतासंस्कारद्वारा यागस्वरूपे ऽप्युपयुज्यते । इदमेव चाश्रयिकर्मेत्युच्यते । तदेवं निरूपितः सङ्केपतो विनियोगविधिः ॥

प्रयोगप्राशुभावबोधको विधिः प्रयोगविधिः । स चाङ्गवाक्यैकवाक्यतापन्नः प्रधानविधिरेव । स हि साङ्गं प्रधानमनुष्ठापयन्विलम्बे प्रमाणाभावादविलम्बापरपर्यायं प्रयोगप्राशुभावं विधत्ते । न च तदविलम्बे ऽपि प्रमाणाभाव इति वाच्यम् । विलम्बे त्वङ्गप्रधानविध्येकवाक्यतावगततत्साहित्यानुपपत्तिः । विलम्बेन क्रियमाणयोः पदार्थयोरिदमनेन सङ्कृतमिति साहित्यव्यवहाराभावात् । स चाविलम्बो नियते क्रमे आश्रीयमाणे भवति । अन्यथा हि किमेतदनन्तरमेतत्कर्तव्यमेतदनन्तरं वेति प्रयोगविशेषापत्तेः । अतः प्रयोगविधिरेव स्वविधेयप्रयोगप्राशुभावसिद्ध्यर्थं नियतं क्रममपि पदार्थविशेषणतया विधत्ते । अत ए-

(१) कर्म आरादुपकारकम् । तच्चेति पाठो ‘ग’ पुस्तके ।

वाङ्मनां क्रमबोधको विधिः प्रयोगविधिरित्यपि लक्षणम् । तत्र क्रमो नाम विततिविशेषः । पौर्वापर्यरूपो वा । तत्र षट् प्रमाणानि श्रुत्यर्थपाठस्थानमुख्यप्रवृत्त्याख्यानानि । तत्र क्रमपरं वचनं श्रुतिः । तच्च द्विविधम् । केवलक्रमपरं तद्विशिष्टपदार्थपरं चेति । तत्र वेदं कृत्वा वेदिं करोतीति केवलक्रमपरं वेदिकरणादेर्वचनान्तरप्राप्तत्वात् । वषट्कर्तुः प्रथमभक्ष इति तु क्रमविशिष्टपदार्थपरम् । एकप्रसरताभङ्गभयेन भक्षानुवादेन क्रममात्रस्य विधातुमशक्यत्वात् । सेयं श्रुतिरितरप्रमाणापेक्षया बलवती तेषां वचनकल्पनद्वारा क्रमप्रमाणत्वात् । अत एवाश्विनग्रहणस्य पाठक्रमात्तृतीयस्थाने ग्रहणप्रसक्तावाश्विनो दशमो गृह्यतइति वचनाद्दशमस्थाने ग्रहणमित्युक्तम् । यत्र प्रयोजनवशेन क्रमनिर्णयः सोऽर्थक्रमः । यथाऽग्निहोत्रं जुहोति यवागूं पचतीत्यग्निहोत्रयवागूपाकयोः । अत्र हि यवाग्वा होमार्थत्वेन तत्पाकः प्रयोजनवशेन पूर्वमनुष्ठीयते । स चायं पाठक्रमाद्वलवान् । यथापाठं ह्यनुष्ठाने क्रमप्रयोजनबाधेऽदृष्टार्थत्वं (१) स्यात् । न हि होमानन्तरं क्रियमाणस्य पाकस्य किंचिदृष्टं प्रयोजनमस्ति । पदार्थबोधकवाक्यानां यः क्रमः स पाठक्रमः । तस्माच्च पदार्थानां क्रम आश्रीयते । येन हि क्रमेण वाक्यानि पठितानि तेनैव क्रमेणाधीतान्यर्थप्रत्ययं जनयन्ति । यथाप्रत्ययं (२) च पदार्थानामनुष्ठानम् । स च पाठो द्विविधः । मन्त्रपाठो ब्राह्मणपाठश्चेति । तत्राग्नेयाग्नीषोमीययोस्तत्तदा-

(१) बाधोऽदृष्टार्थत्वं चेति 'स ग च' पुस्तकयोः ।

(२) यथार्थप्रत्ययमिति पाठो 'ग च' पुस्तकयोः ।

क्यानां याज्यानुवाक्यानां (१) पाठाद्यः क्रम आश्रीयते स मन्त्रपाठात् स चायं मन्त्रपाठो ब्राह्मणपाठाद्वलीयान् । अनुष्ठाने ब्राह्मणवाक्यापेक्षया मन्त्रपाठस्यान्तरङ्गत्वात् । ब्राह्मणवाक्यं हि प्रयोगाद्वह्निरेवेदं कर्तव्यमित्यवबोध्य कृतार्थम् । मन्त्राः पुनः प्रयोगकाले व्याप्रियन्ते । अनुष्ठानक्रमस्य स्मरणक्रमाधीनत्वात् तत्क्रमस्य च मन्त्रक्रमाधीनत्वादनन्तरङ्गो मन्त्रपाठ इति प्रयाजानां समिधो यजति तनूनपातं यजति इत्येवं विधिपाठक्रमाद्यः (२) क्रमः स ब्राह्मणपाठक्रमात् । यद्यपि ब्राह्मणवाक्यान्यर्थं विधाय कृतार्थानि तथापि प्रयाजादीनां क्रमस्मारकान्तरस्याभावात्तान्येव क्रमस्मारकत्वेन स्वीक्रियन्ते ॥

स्थानं नामोपस्थितिः । यस्य हि देशे योऽनुष्ठीयते तत्पूर्वतने पदार्थे कृते स एव प्रथममुपस्थितो भवतीति युक्तं तस्य प्रथममनुष्ठानम् । अत एव साद्यस्के अग्नीषोमीयसवनीयानुबन्ध्यानां सवनीयदेशे सहानुष्ठाने कर्तव्ये आदौ सवनीयपशोरनुष्ठानमितरयोः पश्चात् तस्मिन्देशे आश्विनग्रहणानन्तरं सवनीयस्यैव प्रथममुपस्थितेः । तथा हि । ज्योतिष्टोमे त्रयः पशुयागा अग्नीषोमीयः सवनीय आनुबन्ध्यश्चेति । ते च भिन्नदेशाः । अग्नीषोमीय औपवसथ्ये ऽङ्गि सवनीयः सुत्याकाले आनुबन्ध्यस्त्वन्ते । साद्यस्को नाम सोमयागविशेषः । स चाव्यक्तत्वाज्ज्योतिष्टोमविकारः । अतस्ते त्रयोऽपि पशुयागाः साद्यस्के चोदकप्रा-

(१) स्तत्तयाज्यानुवाक्याक्रमाद्यः क्रम आश्रीयते इति पाठः 'स ग' पुस्तकयोः । स्तत्तयाज्यानुवाक्याक्रम आश्रीयते इति 'च' पुस्तके ॥

(२) इत्येवंविधवाक्यक्रमाद्यः इति 'सग' पुस्तकयोः । इत्येवंविधवाक्यक्रमाद्य इति 'च' पुस्तके ।

प्राः । तेषां तत्र साहित्यं श्रुतं सह पशूनालभत इति । तच्च साहित्यं सवनीयदेशे तस्य प्रधानप्रत्यासत्तेः स्थानातिक्रमण-  
साध्याच्च । सवनीयदेशे ह्यनुष्ठाने ऽग्नीषोमीयानुबन्ध्ययोः स्व-  
स्वस्थानातिक्रमो भवति । अग्नीषोमीयदेशे ऽनुबन्ध्यदेशे वानु-  
ष्ठाने त्रयाणामपि मध्ये द्वयोः स्वस्वस्थानातिक्रमः (१) । तथा च  
प्रकृतावाग्निवग्रहं कृत्वा त्रिवृता यूपं परिवीय सवनीयं पशु-  
मुपाकरोतीत्याश्विनग्रहणानन्तरं सवनीयो विहित इति सा-  
द्यस्के ऽप्याश्विनग्रहणे कृते सवनीय एवोपस्थितो भवत्यतो  
युक्तं तस्य स्थानात्ययमनुष्ठानमितरयोस्तु पश्चादित्युक्तम् ॥

प्रधानक्रमेण यो ऽङ्गानां क्रमः स मुख्यः क्रमः । येन हि क्र-  
मेण प्रधानानि क्रियन्ते तेनैव क्रमेण तेषामङ्गान्यनुष्ठेयन्ते ।  
तदा सर्वेषामङ्गानां स्वैः स्वैः प्रधानैस्तुल्यं व्यवधानं भवति । व्यु-  
त्क्रमेणानुष्ठाने केषां चिदङ्गानां स्वैः प्रधानैरत्यन्तमव्यवधानं  
केषां चिदत्यन्तव्यवधानं स्यात्तच्चायुक्तं प्रयोगविध्यवगतसा-  
हित्यवाधापत्तेः । अतः प्रधानक्रमो ऽपि अङ्गक्रमे हेतुः । अत  
एव प्रयाजशेषेणादावाग्नेयहविषो ऽभिघारणं पश्चादैन्द्रस्य  
दध्नः आग्नेयैन्द्रयागयोः पौर्वापर्यात् । एवं च द्वयोर्द्वयोरभि-  
घारणयोः स्वस्वप्रधानेन तुल्यमेकान्तरितं व्यवधानम् । व्युत्क्र-  
मेणाभिघारणे त्वाग्नेयहविरभिघारणाग्नेययागयोरत्यन्तम-  
व्यवधानम् । ऐन्द्रहव्यभिघारणैन्द्रयागयोर्ज्ञान्तरितं व्यवधानं  
तच्चायुक्तमित्युक्तमेव । स मुख्यः क्रमः पाठक्रमादुर्बलः । मुख्य-  
क्रमो हि प्रमाणान्तरसापेक्षप्रधानक्रमप्रतिपत्तिसापेक्षतया वि-

(१) मपि स्वस्वेति पाठः 'च' पुस्तके ।

लम्बितप्रतिपत्तिकः । पाठक्रमस्तु निरपेक्षसाध्यापठक्रममा-  
त्रसापेक्षतया न तथेति बलवान् । स चायं मुख्यक्रमः प्रवृत्ति-  
क्रमाच्च बलवान् । प्रवृत्तिक्रमे हि द्वितीयादिपदार्थानां प्रथमा-  
नुष्ठितक्रमापेक्षा बहूनामङ्गानां (१) प्रधानविप्रकर्षानुस्यक्रमे  
तु सन्निकर्षात् ॥

सह प्रयुज्यमानेषु प्रधानेषु सन्निपातिनामङ्गानामावृत्त्या ऽनु-  
ष्ठाने कर्तव्ये द्वितीयादिपदार्थानां प्रथमानुष्ठितपदार्थक्रमाद्यः  
क्रमः स प्रवृत्तिक्रमः । यथा प्राजापत्यपञ्चङ्गेषु प्राजापत्या हि  
वैश्वदेवीं कृत्वा प्राजापत्यैश्वरन्तीति वाक्येन तृतीयानिर्देशात्से-  
तिकर्तव्यताका एककालत्वेन विहिता अतस्तेषां तदङ्गानां  
चोपाकरणनियोजनप्रभृतीनां साहित्यं संपाद्यम् । तच्च प्राजा-  
पत्यपशूनां संप्रतिपन्नदेवताकत्वेन (२) युगपदनुष्ठानादुपपद्यते ।  
तदङ्गानां चोपाकरणादीनां युगपदनुष्ठानमशक्यम् । अतस्तेषां  
साहित्यमव्यवहितानुष्ठानात्संपाद्यम् । तच्चैकस्योपाकरणं विधा-  
यापरस्योपाकरणं विधेयम् । एवं नियोजनादिकमपि । तथा च  
प्राजापत्येषु कस्माच्चित्पशोरारभ्य एकं सर्वं सर्वत्रानुष्ठाय (३)  
द्वितीयादिपदार्थस्तेनैव क्रमेणानुष्ठेयः स प्रवृत्तिक्रमः । सो ऽयं  
श्रुत्यादिभ्यो दुर्बलः । तदेवं संक्षेपतो निरूपितः षड्विधक्रमनि-  
रूपणेन प्रयोगविधिः ॥

कर्मजन्यफलस्वाम्यबोधको विधिरधिकारविधिः । कर्मज-

(१) बलवान् । प्रवृत्तिक्रमाच्च बलवान् । प्रवृत्तिक्रमे हि बहूनामङ्गानामिति पाठो  
'ग च' पुस्तकयोः ॥

(२) देवताकालत्वेनेति पाठः केषु चित्पुस्तकेष्वासीदिति टीकासेततो ऽवगम्यते ।

(३) एकं सर्वत्रानुष्ठायेति पाठः 'ख ग च' पुस्तकेषु ।



न्यफलस्वास्थ्यं कर्मजन्यफलभोक्तृत्वम् । स च यजेत स्वर्गकाम  
इत्यादिरूपः । स्वर्गमुद्दिश्य यागं विदधता ऽनेन स्वर्गकामस्य  
यागजन्यफलभोक्तृत्वं प्रतिपाद्यते । यस्याहिताग्नेरग्निर्गृहान्  
दहेत्सो ऽग्नये शामवते ऽष्टाकपालं निर्वपेदित्यादिनाग्निदाहा-  
दौ निमित्ते कर्म विदधता निमित्तवतः कर्मजन्यपापक्षयरूप-  
फलस्वास्थ्यं प्रतिपाद्यते । एवमहरहः सन्ध्यामुपासीतेत्यादिना  
शुचिविहितकालजीविनः सन्ध्योपासनजन्यप्रत्यवायपरिहार-  
रूपफलस्वास्थ्यं चोद्यते । तच्च फलस्वास्थ्यं तस्यैव यो ऽधिकारवि-  
शिष्टः । अधिकारश्च (१) यद्विधिवाक्येषु पुरुषविशेषणत्वेन श्रूय-  
ते । यथा काम्ये कर्मणि फलकामना नैमित्ते कर्मणि निमित्त-  
निश्चयः । नित्ये सन्ध्योपासनादौ शुचिविहितकालजीवित्वम् ।  
अत एव राजा राजसूयेन स्वाराज्यकामो यजेतेत्यनेन विधि-  
वाक्येन स्वाराज्यमुद्दिश्य विदधतापि न स्वाराज्यमात्रकामस्य  
तत्फलभोक्तृत्वं प्रतिपाद्यते । किं तु राज्ञः सतः स्वाराज्यकाम-  
स्यैव राजत्वस्यापि अधिकारविशेषणत्वेन श्रवणात् । क्वचित्तु  
पुरुषविशेषणत्वेनाश्रुतमप्यधिकारविशेषणम् । यथाध्ययनवि-  
धिसिद्धा विद्या क्रतुविधीनामर्थज्ञानापेक्षणीयत्वेनाध्ययनविधि-  
सिद्ध्यर्थज्ञानवन्तं प्रत्येव प्रवृत्तेः । एवमग्निसाध्यकर्मसु आधा-  
नसिद्धाग्निमत्ता । अग्निसाध्यकर्मणामग्न्यपेक्षत्वेन तद्विधीना-  
माधानसिद्धाग्निमन्तं प्रत्येव प्रवृत्तेः । एवं सामर्थ्यमपि । आ-  
ख्यातानामर्थं ब्रुवतां शक्तिः सद्धारिणीति न्यायात् समर्थं प्र-  
त्येव विधिप्रवृत्तेः । तदेवं निरूपितो विधिः ॥

(१) अधिकारश्च स एवेति 'स ग च' पुस्तकेषु ।

प्रयोगसमवेतार्थस्मारका मन्त्राः । तेषां च तादृशार्थस्मारक-  
त्वेनैवार्थवत्त्वम् । न तु तदुच्चारणमदृष्टार्थम् । संभवति दृष्टफल-  
कत्वे ऽदृष्टफलकल्पनाया अन्याय्यत्वात् । न च दृष्टस्यार्थस्मरणस्य  
प्रकारान्तरेणापि संभवान्मन्त्रान्नानं व्यर्थमिति वाच्यम् । मन्त्रै-  
रेव स्मर्तव्यमिति नियमविध्याश्रयणात् । नानासाधनसाध्यक्रि-  
यायामेकसाधनप्राप्तावप्राप्तस्यापरसाधनस्य प्रापको विधिर्निय-  
मविधिः । (१) यथाहुः । विधिरत्यन्तमप्राप्तौ नियमः पाक्षिके  
सति । तत्र चान्यत्र च प्राप्तौ परिसंख्येति गीयतइति । अस्यार्थः ।  
प्रमाणान्तरेणाप्राप्तस्य प्रापको विधिरपूर्वविधिः । यथा यजेत स्व-  
र्गकाम इत्यादिः । स्वर्गार्थकयागस्य प्रमाणान्तरेणाप्राप्तस्यानेन  
विधानात् । पक्षे ऽप्राप्तस्य प्रापको विधिर्नियमविधिः । यथा  
ब्रोहीनवहन्तीत्यादिः । कथमस्य पक्षे ऽप्राप्तप्रापकत्वमिति चे-  
दित्यम् । अनेन ह्यवघातस्य वैतुष्यार्थत्वं न प्रतिपाद्यते ऽन्व-  
यव्यतिरेकसिद्धत्वात् । किं तु नियमः । स चाप्राप्तांशपूरणम् ।  
वैतुष्यस्य हि नानोपायसाध्यत्वाद्यदा ऽवघातं परित्यज्य उपा-  
यान्तरं गृहीतुमारभते तदा ऽवघातस्याप्राप्तत्वेन तद्विधानना-  
मकमप्राप्तांशपूरणमेवानेन विधिना क्रियते । अतश्च नियमवि-  
धावप्राप्तांशपूरणात्मको नियम एव वाक्यार्थः । पक्षे ऽप्राप्ताव-  
घातस्य विधानमिति यावत् । उभयोश्च युगपत्प्राप्तावितरव्यावृ-  
त्तिपरो विधिः परिसंख्याविधिः । यथा पञ्च पञ्चनखा भक्ष्या  
इति । इदं हि वाक्यं न पञ्चनखभक्षणपरं तस्य रागतः प्राप्त-

(१) साधनद्वयस्य पक्षे प्राप्तावन्यतरसाधनस्याप्राप्तादज्ञायां यो विधिः स नियम-  
विधिरिति पाठः 'च' पुस्तके ।

त्वात् । नापि नियमपरं पञ्चनखापञ्चनखभक्षणस्य युगपत्प्राप्तेः पक्षे प्राप्त्यभावात् । अत इदमपञ्चनखभक्षणनिवृत्तिपरमिति भवति परिसंख्याविधिः । सा च द्विविधा । श्रौती लाक्षणिकी चेति । तत्रात्र ह्येवावयन्तीति श्रौती परिसंख्या । एवकारेण पवमानातिरिक्तस्तोत्रव्यावृत्तेरभिधानात् । पञ्च पञ्चनखा भक्ष्या इति तु लाक्षणिकी । इतरनिवृत्तिवाचकपदाभावात् । अत एवैषा त्रिदोषग्रस्ता । दोषत्रयं च श्रुतहानिरश्रुतकल्पना प्राप्तबाधश्चेति । तदुक्तम् । श्रुतार्थस्य परित्यागादश्रुतार्थप्रकल्पनात् । प्राप्तस्य बाधादित्येवं परिसंख्या त्रिदूषणा इति श्रुतस्य पञ्चनखभक्षणस्य हानाद् अश्रुतापञ्चनखभक्षणनिवृत्तेः कल्पनात्प्राप्तस्य चापञ्चनखभक्षणस्य बाधनादिति । अस्मिंश्च दोषत्रये दोषद्वयं शब्दनिष्ठम् । प्राप्तबाधस्त्वर्थनिष्ठ इति दिक् । येषां तु प्रयोगसमवेतार्थस्मारकत्वं न संभवति तदुच्चारणस्यानन्यगत्या ऽदृष्टार्थकत्वं कल्प्यते इति नानर्थक्यमिति ॥

नामधेयानां च विधेयार्थपरिच्छेदकतया ऽर्थवत्त्वम् । तथा हि । उद्भिदा यजेत पशुकाम इत्यत्रोद्भिच्छब्दो यागनामधेयं तेन च विधेयार्थपरिच्छेदः (१) क्रियते । तथा हि । अनेन वाक्येनाप्राप्तत्वात् फलोद्देशेन यागो विधीयते । यागसामान्यस्याविधेयत्वाद् यागविशेष एव विधीयते । तत्र को ऽसौ यागविशेष इत्यपेक्षायामुद्भिच्छब्दादुद्भिद्रूपो याग इति विज्ञायते उद्भिदा यागेन पशुं भावयेदित्यत्र सामानाधिकरण्येन नामधेयान्वयान् । नामधेयत्वं च निमित्तचतुष्टयात् । मत्वर्थलक्षणाभयादाक्य-

(१) अभिधेयार्थपरिच्छेद इति 'व' पुस्तके ।

भेदभयात्तत्प्रत्यक्षात्तद्व्यपदेशादिति ॥

तत्रोद्भिदा यजेत पशुकाम इत्यत्रोद्भिच्छब्दस्य यागनामधेयत्वं मत्वर्थलक्षणाभयात् । तथा हि । न तावदनेन वाक्येन फलं प्रति यागविधानं तं प्रति च गुणविधानं युज्यते । वाक्यभेदापत्तेः । उद्भिच्छब्दस्य गुणसमर्पकत्वे च यागस्याप्यप्राप्तत्वाद्गुणविशिष्टकर्मविधानं वाच्यम् । उद्भिदता यागेन पशुं भावयेदिति । विशिष्टविधौ मत्वर्थलक्षणेत्युक्तमेव ॥

चित्रया यजेत पशुकाम इत्यत्र चित्राशब्दस्य कर्मनामधेयत्वं वाक्यभेदभयात् । तथा हि । न तावदत्र गुणविशिष्टयागविधानं संभवति । दधि मधु पयो घृतं धाना उदकं तण्डुलाः तत्संस्पृष्टं प्राजापत्यमित्यनेन गुणस्य विहितत्वात्तद्विशिष्टयागविधानुपपत्तेः । यागस्य फलसंबन्धे गुणसंबन्धे च विधीयमाने वाक्यभेदः । तस्माच्चित्राशब्दः कर्मनामधेयम् । तथा च चित्रायागेन पशुं भावयेदिति सामानाधिकरण्येनान्वयान्न वाक्यभेदः । प्रकृतेष्टेरेनेकद्रव्यत्वेन चित्राशब्दवाच्यत्वोपपत्तिः । अग्निहोत्रं जुहोतीत्यत्राग्निहोत्रशब्दस्य कर्मनामधेयत्वं तत्प्रत्यक्षात् । तस्य गुणस्य प्रख्यापकस्य प्रापकस्य (१) शाखस्य विद्यमानत्वाद् अग्निहोत्रशब्दः कर्मनामधेयमिति यावत् । नन्वयं गुणविधेरेव कुतो नेति चेन्न । यद्यग्नौ होत्रमस्मिन्निति सप्तमीसमासमाश्रित्य होमाधारत्वेनाग्निरूपो गुणो विधेयस्तदा यदाहवनीये जुहोतीत्यनेनैवाग्नेः प्राप्तत्वात्तद्विधानानर्थक्यम् । अग्नये होत्रमिति चतुर्थीसमासमाश्रित्य अग्निदेवतारूपगुणो ऽनेन विधीयतइति

(१) तस्य प्रख्यापकस्येति पाठः 'ख ग' पुस्तकयोः ।

चेन्न । तद्देवतायाः शास्त्रान्तरेण प्राप्तत्वात् । किं तच्छास्त्रान्तर-  
मिति चेत् । यदग्नये च प्रजापतये च सायं जुहोतीति केचित् ।  
अपरे त्वग्निर्ज्योतिर्ज्योतिरग्निस्साहेति मन्त्रवर्ण एवाग्निरूपदे-  
वताप्रापकः । नन्वग्नेर्मन्त्रवर्णिकत्वे प्रजापतिदेवताया बाधः  
स्यात् । मन्त्रवर्णस्य चतुर्थीतो दुर्बलत्वात् । यथाहुः ॥

तद्वितेन चतुर्थ्या च मन्त्रवर्णेन वा पुनः ।

देवताया विधिस्तत्र दुर्बलं तु परंपरमिति ॥

चेन्न । यदग्नये च प्रजापतये च सायं जुहोतीत्यत्र न केवलं  
प्रजापतिविधानम् । किं तु मन्त्रवर्णप्राप्तमग्निमनूय तत्समुच्चि-  
तप्रजापतेः । एवं च न बाधः केवलप्रजापतिविधानाभावात् । न  
चात्र समुच्चितोभयविधानमेव कथं नेति वाच्यम् । समुच्चितो-  
भयविधानापेक्षया ऽन्यतः प्राप्तमग्निमनूय तत्समुच्चितप्रजाप-  
तिमात्रविधाने लाघवात् । एवं च प्रयाजेषु समिदादिदेवतानां  
समिधः समिधो अग्न आज्यस्य व्यन्वित्यादिमन्त्रवर्णभ्यः प्राप्त-  
त्वात् । समिधो यजतीत्यादिषु समिदादिशब्दास्तत्प्रत्यशास्त्रा-  
त्कर्मनामधेयाः ॥

श्येनेनाभिचरन् यजेतेत्यत्र श्येनशब्दस्य कर्मनामधेयत्वं त-  
द्गुपदेशात् । तेन व्यपदेशादुपमानात्तदन्यथानुपपत्तेरिति याव-  
त् । तथा हि यद्विधेयं तस्य स्तुतिर्भवति । यद्यत्र श्येनो विधेयः  
स्यात् तदार्थवादैस्तस्यैव स्तुतिः कार्या । यथा वै श्येनो निपत्या-  
दत्ते एवमयं द्विषन्तं भ्रातृव्यं निपत्यादत्त इत्यनेनार्थवादेन श्येनः  
स्तोतुं न शक्यः । श्येनोपमानेनार्थान्तरस्तुतेः क्रियमाणत्वात् ।  
न च श्येनोपमानत्वेन स एव स्तोतुं शक्यते । उपमानोपमेयभा-

वस्य भिन्ननिष्ठत्वात् । यदा तु श्येनसंज्ञको यागो विधीयते त-  
दार्थवादेन श्येनोपमानेन तस्य स्तुतिः कर्तुं शक्यतइति श्येनश-  
ब्दः कर्मनामधेयं तद्गुपदेशादिति । उत्पत्तिशिष्टगुणवलीयस्त्व-  
मपि पञ्चमं नामधेयनिमित्तमिति कचित् । यथा वैश्वदेवेन  
यजेतेत्यादौ । अत्रोत्पत्तिशिष्टाग्न्यादीनां वलीयस्त्वाद्वैश्वदेवश-  
ब्दस्य विश्वेदेवदेवताविधायकत्वं न संभवतीति कर्मनामधेयत्व-  
म् । वस्तुतस्तु तत्प्रत्यशास्त्रादेवास्य कर्मनामधेयत्वम् । प्रकृत-  
यागो विश्वेदेवरूपगुणसंप्रतिपन्नशास्त्रस्यार्थवादरूपस्यैव सत्त्वा-  
त् । यदिश्वेदेवाः समयजन्त तद्वैश्वदेवस्य वैश्वदेवत्वम् ॥

पुरुषस्य निवर्तकं वाक्यं निषेधः । निषेधवाक्यानामनर्थहेतु-  
क्रियानिवृत्तिजनकत्वेनैवार्थवत्त्वात् । तथा हि । यथा विधिः प्र-  
वर्तनां प्रतिपादयन् स्वप्रवर्तकत्वं निर्वाहार्थं विधेयस्य यागादेरि-  
ष्टसाधनत्वमाश्रिपन् पुरुषं तत्र प्रवर्तयति तथा न कलञ्जं भक्ष-  
येदित्यादिनिषेधो ऽपि निवर्तनां प्रतिपादयन् स्वनिवर्तकत्वं नि-  
र्वाहार्थं निषेधस्य कलञ्जभक्षणस्य परानिष्टसाधनत्वमाश्रिपन्  
पुरुषं ततो निवर्तयति । ननु निषेधवाक्यस्य कथं निवर्तनाप्रति-  
पादकत्वमिति चेदुच्यते । न तावदत्र धात्वर्थस्य नञर्थेनान्वयः ।  
अव्यवधाने ऽपि तस्य प्रत्ययार्थभावनोपसर्जनत्वेनोपस्थितेः । न  
ह्यन्योपसर्जनत्वेनोपस्थितमन्यत्रान्वेति । अन्यथा राजपुरुष-  
मानयेत्यादावपि राज्ञः क्रियान्वयापत्तेः । अतः प्रत्ययार्थस्यैव  
नञर्थेनान्वयः । तत्रापि नाख्यातत्वांशवाच्यार्थभावनायास्तस्या  
लिङंशवाच्यप्रवर्तनोपसर्जनत्वेनोपस्थितेः । किं तु लिङंशवा-  
च्यशब्दभावनायास्तस्याः सर्वापेक्षया प्रधानत्वात् । नञश्चैव स्व-



भावो यत्स्वसमभिव्याहृतपदार्थविरोधिबोधकत्वम् । यथा घटो नास्तीत्यादौ अस्तीतिशब्दसमभिव्याहृतो नञ् घटसत्त्वविरोधि घटासत्त्वं गमयति तद्विद्ध लिङ्समभिव्याहृतो नञ् लिङर्थ-प्रवर्तनाविरोधनीं निवर्तनामेव बोधयति । विधिवाक्यश्रवणे ऽयं मां प्रवर्तयतीति प्रतीतेः (१) । तस्मान्निषेधवाक्यस्थले निवर्तनैव वाक्यार्थः । यदा तु प्रत्ययार्थस्य तत्रान्वये बाधकं तदा धात्वर्थ-स्यैव तत्रान्वयः । तच्च बाधकं द्विविधम् । तस्य व्रतमित्युपक्रमो विकल्पप्रसक्तिश्च । तत्राद्यं नेशेतोद्यन्तमादित्यमित्यादौ तस्य व्रतमित्युपक्रमस्यैतदाक्यपाठात् । तथा चात्र पर्युदासाश्रयणम् । तथा हि । व्रतशब्दस्य कर्त्तव्यार्थे रूढत्वात्तस्य व्रतमित्यत्र स्ना-तकस्य व्रतानां कर्त्तव्यत्वेनोपक्रमात् । किं तत्कर्त्तव्यमित्याका-ङ्क्षायां नेशेतोद्यन्तमित्यादिना कर्त्तव्यार्थ एव प्रतिपादनीयः । अन्यथा पूर्वोत्तरवाक्ययोरेकवाक्यत्वं न स्यात् । तथा च न-जर्थेन न प्रत्ययार्थान्वयः । कर्त्तव्यार्थानवबोधात् । विध्यर्थप्रव-र्त्तनाविरोधिनिवर्तनाया एव तादृशनञ्चा बोधनात् । तस्माच्च कर्त्तव्यार्थत्वाभावात् । तस्मान्नेच्छेतेत्यत्र नञा धात्वर्थविरोधनी-क्षणसंकल्प एव लक्षणया प्रतिपाद्यते तस्य कर्त्तव्यत्वसंभवात् । आदित्यविषयकानोक्षणसंकल्पेन भावयेदिति वाक्यार्थः । तत्र भाव्याकाङ्क्षायां एतावता ह्येनसा वियुक्तो भवतीति वाक्यशेषा-

(१) प्रतीतिरिति । प्रवर्तनाप्रतीतिरित्यर्थः । यद्वा यजेत स्वर्गकाम इति विधिवा-क्यश्रवणे ऽयं मां प्रवर्तयतीति प्रवर्तनाप्रतीतिवज्र कलङ्जं भक्षयेदित्यादिनिषेधवा-क्यश्रवणे ऽप्ययं मां निवर्तयतीति निवर्तनाप्रतीतिरित्यध्याहारेण, विधीत्यादिहेतुवा-क्यं दृष्टान्तदार्ष्टान्तिकविधया योजनीयमिति टीकाग्रन्थः । एतदनुसारेण क्वचित्पुस्तके पाठभेदो ऽपि ॥

वगतः पापशयो भाव्यतया ऽन्वेति । एवं च पूर्वोत्तरयोरेकवाक्यत्वं निर्वहत्येव । न चात्र धात्वर्थविरोधिनः पदार्थान्तरस्यापि सं-भवात्कथमनोक्षणसंकल्पस्यैव भावनान्वय इति वाच्यम् । तस्य कर्त्तव्यताभावेन प्रकृते भावनान्वयायोग्यत्वात् । द्वितीयं यज-तिषु येयजामहं करोति नानुयाजेष्वित्यादौ अत्र विकल्पप्रस-क्तौ च पर्युदासाश्रयणात् । तथा हि यद्यत्र वाक्ये नजर्थे प्रत्य-यार्थान्वयः स्यात्तदानुयाजेषु येयजामहमिति मन्त्रस्य प्रतिषेधः स्यात् । अनुयाजेषु येयजामहं न कुर्यादिति । स च प्राप्तिपूर्वक एव प्राप्तस्यैव प्रतिषेधात् । प्राप्तिश्च यजतिषु येयजामहं करोती-ति शास्त्रादेव वाच्या शास्त्रप्राप्तस्य च प्रतिषेधे विकल्प एव न तु बाधः । प्राप्तिमूलरागस्यैव तन्मूलशास्त्रस्य शास्त्रान्तरेण बाधायो-गात् । न च पदे जुहोतीति विशेषशास्त्रेणाहवनीये जुहोती-ति शास्त्रस्यैव नानुयाजेष्वित्यनेन यजतिषु येयजामहं करोती-त्यस्य बाधः स्यादिति वाच्यम् । परस्परनिरपेक्षयोरेव शास्त्रयो-र्बाध्यबाधकभावात् । पदशास्त्रस्य हि स्वार्थविधानार्थमाहवनी-यशास्त्रानपेक्षणान्निरपेक्षत्वम् । प्रकृते तु निषेधशास्त्रस्य निषे-ध्यप्रसक्त्यर्थं यजतिषु येयजामहमित्यस्यापेक्षणान्न निरपेक्षत्व-म् । तस्माच्छास्त्रविहितस्य शास्त्रान्तरेण प्रतिषेधे विकल्प एव । स च न युक्तः । विकल्पे शास्त्रस्य पाश्चिकाप्रामाण्यसंपातात् । न ह्यनुयाजेषु येयजामहमित्यस्यानुष्ठाने नानुयाजेष्वित्यस्य प्रामाण्यं संभवति । ब्रीहियागानुष्ठाने यवशास्त्रस्यैव द्विरदृष्टक-ल्पना च स्यात् । विधिप्रतिषेधयोरपि पुरुषार्थत्वात् । अतो नात्र प्रतिषेधस्याश्रयणं किं तु नञो ऽनुयाजसंबन्धमाश्रित्य

पर्युदासस्यैव । इत्थं चानुयाजव्यतिरिक्तेषु यजतिषु येयजाम-  
हमिति मन्त्रं कुर्यादिति वाक्यार्थबोधः । नञोऽनुयाजव्यतिरि-  
क्ते लाक्षणिकत्वात् । एवं च न विकल्पः । अत्र च वाक्ये येयजा-  
महइति न विधीयते यजतिषु येयजामह इत्यनेनैव च प्राप्तत्वा-  
त् । किं तु सामान्यशास्त्रप्राप्तयेयजामह इत्यनुवादेन तस्यानु-  
याजव्यतिरिक्तविषयत्वं विधीयते । यद्यजतिषु येयजामहं क-  
रोतीति तदनुयाजव्यतिरिक्तेष्वेवेति । नन्वेवं सामान्यशास्त्रप्रा-  
प्तस्य विशेषे संकोचनरूपादुपसंहारात्पर्युदासस्य भेदो न  
स्यादिति चेन्न । उपसंहारो हि तन्मात्रसंकोचार्थः । यथा पु-  
रोडाशं चतुर्धा करोतीति सामान्यप्राप्तं चतुर्धाकरणम् । आ-  
ग्नेयं चतुर्धा करोतीति विशेषादाग्नेयपुरोडाशमात्रे संकोच्य-  
ते । पर्युदासस्तु तदन्यमात्रसंकोचार्थ इति ततो भेदात् । कुत्र  
चित् विकल्पप्रसक्तावप्यनन्यगत्या प्रतिषेधाश्रयणम् । यथा ना-  
तिरात्रे षोडशिनं गृह्णातीत्यादौ । अत्र हि अतिरात्रे षोडशिनं  
गृह्णातीति शास्त्रप्राप्तषोडशिश्रवणस्य निषेधादिकल्पप्रसक्तावपि  
न पर्युदासाश्रयणम् । असंभवात् । तथा हि । यद्यत्र षोडशिप-  
दायन नञर्थान्नयस्तदातिरात्रे षोडशिव्यतिरिक्तं गृह्णातीति  
वाक्यार्थबोधः स्यात्स च न संभवति । अतिरात्रे षोडशिनं गृ-  
ह्णातीति प्रत्यक्षविधिविरोधात् । यदि चातिरात्रेण पदार्थेना-  
न्वयस्तदातिरात्रव्यतिरिक्ते षोडशिनं गृह्णातीति वाक्यार्थबोधः  
स्यात्सोऽपि न संभवति तद्विधिविरोधात् । अतोऽत्रानन्य-  
गत्या शास्त्रप्राप्तषोडशिश्रवणस्यैव निषेधः । न च विकल्पप्रस-  
क्तिः तस्याप्यपेक्षणीयत्वात् । इयांस्तुविशेषो यद्विकल्पादेकप्रति-

षेधेऽपि प्रतिषिध्यमानस्य नानर्थहेतुत्वम् । विधिनिषेधीभ्य-  
स्यापि क्रत्वर्थत्वात् । यत्र तु न विकल्पः प्राप्तिश्च रागत एव प्र-  
तिषेधश्च पुरुषार्थः तत्र प्रतिषिध्यमानस्यानर्थहेतुत्वम् । यथा न  
कलञ्जं भक्षयेदित्यादौ कलञ्जभक्षणादेः । तत्र भक्षणनिषेध-  
स्यैव पुरुषार्थत्वात् । न च दीक्षितो न ददाति न जुहोतीत्यादौ  
शास्त्रप्राप्तदानहोमादीनां निषेधादिकल्पापत्तिरिति वाच्यम् ।  
स्वतः पुरुषार्थभूतदानहोमादीनां निषेधस्य पुरुषार्थत्वाभावे  
ऽपि ( १ ) निषिध्यमानस्यानर्थहेतुत्वात् यथा ऋतौ स्वस्तीगम-  
नादेः । तन्निषेधस्य क्रत्वर्थत्वेन तस्य क्रतुवैगुण्यसंपादकत्वात् ॥

प्राशस्त्यनिन्दान्यतरपरं वाक्यमर्थवादः । तस्य च लक्षणया  
प्रयोजनवदर्थपर्यवसानम् । तथा हि । अर्थवादवाक्यं हि स्वार्थ-  
प्रतिपादने प्रयोजनाभावाद्विधेयनिषेध्ययोः प्राशस्त्यनिन्दितत्वे  
लक्षणया प्रतिपादयति । स्वार्थमात्रपरत्वे आनर्थक्यप्रसङ्गात् ।  
आम्नायस्य हि क्रियार्थत्वात् । न चेष्टापत्तिः । स्वाध्यायोऽध्ये-  
तव्य इत्यध्ययनविधिना सकलवेदाध्ययनं कर्त्तव्यमिति बोधय-  
ता सर्ववेदस्य प्रयोजनवदर्थपर्यवसायित्वं सूचयतोपात्तत्वेना-  
नर्थक्यानुपपत्तेः । स द्विविधः । विधिगोष्ठो निषेधगोष्ठश्चेति । तत्र  
वायव्यं श्वेतमालभेत भूतिकाम इत्यादिविधिशेषस्य वायुर्वै-  
लपिष्टा देवतेत्यादेर्विधेयार्थप्राशस्त्यबोधकतयार्थवत्त्वम् । ब-  
र्हिषि रजतं न देयमित्यादिनिषेधशेषस्य सोऽरोदीद्यदरो-  
दीत्तद्द्रुद्रस्य रुद्रत्वमित्यादेर्निषेधस्य निन्दितत्वबोधकतयार्थ-  
वत्त्वम् । न च प्राशस्त्यादिविधेयस्य निषेधप्रयोजनत्वेन नार्थवाद-

स्यार्थवत्त्वमिति वाच्यम् । आलस्यादिवशादप्रवर्त्तमानस्य  
पुंसः प्रवृत्त्यादिजनकत्वेन तद्बोधस्योपयोगात् । स पनस्वेधा ।  
तदुक्तम् । विरोधे गुणवादः स्यादनुवादोऽवधारिते । भूतार्थ-  
वादस्तद्धानादर्थवादस्त्रिधा मत इति । अस्यार्थः । प्रमाणान्तर-  
विरोधे सत्यर्थवादो गुणवादः । यथाऽऽदित्यो यूप इत्यादि ।  
यूपे आदित्याभेदस्य प्रत्यक्षबाधितत्वादादित्यवदुज्ज्वलत्व-  
पगुणोऽनेन लक्षणया प्रतिपाद्यते । प्रमाणान्तरावगतार्थबोध-  
कोऽनुवादः । यथाऽग्निर्हिमस्य भेषजमित्यत्र हिमविरोधि-  
त्वस्याग्नौ प्रत्यक्षावगतत्वात् । प्रमाणान्तरविरोधतत्प्राप्ति(१)-  
रहितार्थबोधको वादो भूतार्थवादः । यथेन्द्रो वृत्राय वज्रमुद-  
यच्छदित्यादि । एवं च यजेत स्वर्गकाम इत्यादि निखिलवेदस्य  
साक्षात्परंपरया वा यागादिधर्मप्रतिपादकत्वं सिद्धम् । सोऽयं  
धर्मो यदुद्दिश्य विहितस्तदुद्देशेन क्रियमाणस्तद्देतुः । ईश्वरा-  
र्पणबुद्ध्या क्रियमाणस्तु निश्चयसहेतुः । न च तदर्पणबुद्धानुष्ठाने  
प्रमाणाभावः । यत्करोषि यदश्नासि यज्जुहोषि ददासि यत ।  
यत्तपस्यसि कौन्तेय तत्कुरुष्व मदर्पणमिति भगवद्गीतास्मृते-  
रेव प्रमाणत्वात् । स्मृतिचरणे तत्प्रामाण्यस्य श्रुतिमूलकत्वेन  
व्यवस्थापनादिति शिवम् ॥

बालानां सुखबोधाय भास्करेण सुमेधसा ।

रचितोऽयं समासेन जैमिनीयार्थसंग्रहः ॥

इति श्रीमहोपाध्यायलौगाक्षिभास्करविरचितपूर्वमीमांसा-  
र्थसंग्रहनामकं प्रकरणं समाप्तिमगात् ॥

(१) प्रमाणान्तरविरोधतः स्तुति इति पाठो ग च पुस्तकयोः ।

## TRANSLATION.

Reverence to Krishna.—

Having shown his reverence to Vāsudeva the husband of Ramā, Laugākshi—Bhāskara composes the Artha-Samgraha as an introduction to the doctrine of Jaimini.

The highly benevolent reverend Jaimini has composed a book in twelve adhyāyas for the discriminative knowledge of duty. At its beginning he speaks of the desire of knowing duty in the following aphorism “next therefore a desire to know duty”. In this aphorism the word “next” expresses the immediate consecution (of the desire of knowing duty) on the reading of the Veda. The word “therefore” expresses the circumstance of the reading of the Veda having a visible purpose (and not merely tending to produce an unseen result as f. i. the performance of the sacrifices does), as the passage enjoining the reading of the Veda (viz. “one is to read the Veda”) settles that this reading has for its visible purpose the knowledge of the sense of the Veda. (For a proper understanding of the aphorism quoted above) we have therefore to complement the aphorism as follows “Because the reading of the Veda has a visible purpose which consists in the knowledge of its sense, for this reason, after the reading of the Veda, the desire of knowing duty which latter is the purport of the Veda has to be entertained. The phrase “desire of knowing” implies the idea of enquiry, so that the aphorism actually refers to the beginning of the (Mīmāṃsā—) śāstra and means “this Śāstra whose matter is the enquiry into duty is to be begun.” (1)

Here the question arises :—What is duty? what is its distinctive character (its definition)?—To this we reply : Sacrifices etc. only(2) are duty; and we define duty as that matter which has a

(1) For a full discussion of the not very important question of the meaning of atha and atas see Jaim. Nyāya M. V. pp. 11. 12.

(2) The word “only” serves to exclude quasi—religious acts like the worship of chaityas which are not taught in the Veda.

purpose and is to be accomplished according to the Veda. The phrase "which has a purpose" serves to exclude from the things comprised in the definition matters which are themselves of the nature of a purpose (as f. i. the different results of the sacrifices viz. paradise etc.).—The phrase "which is to be accomplished according to the Veda" serves to exclude from the definition matters like the act of eating (which is performed not on the authority of the Veda but on the prompting of a natural instinct). The word "matter" (artha; which includes the idea of goodness or usefulness) serves to exclude actions like the sacrifice called "Śyena", which are to be considered as bad things (anartha) on account of their having a bad result (viz. the death of some enemy, for the bringing about of which the sacrificer himself will have to go to hell).<sup>(1)</sup>

Here it might be objected that this definition of duty is in conflict with the definition given in the Mīmāṃsā-Sūtras where it is said (I. 2) "Duty is that matter the distinctive character of which is instigation"; in which latter definition the word "instigation" denotes only that one part of the Veda which has the form of injunctions (vidhi).—To this we reply that in reality the two definitions are not conflicting because in the Sūtra also the word "instigation" denotes the Veda in general as the whole Veda on account of its aiming at duty serves to express the accomplishment of duty.

(If now we be asked to point out in detail the appropriateness of our definition of duty we proceed:) Acts of duty as sacrifices etc. are enjoined with reference to man by vedic sentences (as f. i. "he who is desirous of paradise is to sacrifice") in which paradise etc. is pointed out as the result. The particulars are as follows. The word "yajeta" "he may sacrifice" contains two constituent elements viz. the root yaj (yaji) and the suffix. The suffix again contains

(1) Cp. Jaim. Nyāy. M. V. pp. 14. 15. But why then—might it be asked—are Sacrifices of the nature of the Śyena taught in the Veda?—To this question the Sabara—bhāṣhya (p. 5) answers: (Katham punar anarthaḥ kartavyatayopadiśyate—uchyate—) naiva śyenaḥ kartavyaḥ vijñāyante—yo hi himsitum iccheth tasyāyam abhyupāyah—iti hi teshāṃ upadeśaḥ—śyenaḥ abhicharan yajeta iti hi samāmananti—na abhicharitavyam iti.

two elements as it expresses as well the property of a verb as the property of an optative. The property of expressing a verb is common to the suffixes of the ten moods and tenses (all of which when added to a root turn the latter into a verb); the property of expressing an optative exclusively belongs to the optative suffixes.—Both elements express a creative energy (bhāvanā) only.<sup>(1)</sup> By bhāvanā ("creative energy" or "productive energy" or "tendency to realize something") we understand the particular activity of some productive agent (bhāvayitṛi) which tends to bring about the existence of something which is going to be (bhaviṭṛi; which is capable of future existence). Such productive energy is twofold being either verbal (śabda) or actual (ārtha).—By "verbal bhāvanā" we understand the peculiar activity of some productive agent which tends to make a person act; it is expressed by the optative element (of words like "yajeta"); for if some person hears a verb with an optative termination there arises in his mind the exclusive notion "he (the speaker) instigates me to act; he is engaged in an energy tending to make me act." (In this explanation of the element which expresses the bhāvanā we proceed) according to the general rule that whatever is exclusively understood in consequence of some word being uttered is expressed by it (is the sense of the word); as f. i. in the sentence "bring the cow" the general character of cow (gotva) is the sense of the word "cow." The peculiar activity (which has been mentioned above in the definition of bhāvanā) is in the case of a sentence belonging to ordinary worldly language some particular intention dwelling in the mind of a speaking person; in vedic sentences on the other hand where there is no speaking person it resides only in the words characterized by optative terminations etc. For this reason this bhāvanā is called verbal bhāvanā.

This bhāvanā requires three constituent elements; the matter which is to be accomplished (the result; sādhya); the means by which the result is effected (the instrument; sādhana); and the mode in which the result is effected (itikartavyatā); according to the three questions (suggested by each bhāvanā): what is to be ef-

(1) The word "only" is meant to exclude the agent (kartṛi) etc.



fect? by what means is it to be effected? how is it to be effected?—Here now the want of a result to be accomplished being felt there steps in the actual bhāvanā (ārthī bhāvanā) with its three constituent elements which we shall explain further on and fills the place of the wanted result, since here takes place a samānābhidhāna-śruti i. e. a direct statement of the intimate connexion of two matters by means of the two being expressed by the same word, (the śābdī as well as the ārtī bhāvanā being expressed by the one optative form). (To supply the ārtī bhāvanā—i. e. the peculiar energy of a person to which the śābdī bhāvanā instigates—as that which is to be accomplished is more natural than to supply anything else as f. i. the sacrifice itself, because the optative form of words like “yajeta” expresses both bhāvanās, from which circumstance the intimate connexion of the two is readily inferred). It might perhaps be remarked by some one that other matters too, as f. i. number (i. e. singular, dual, plural) and time (present etc.) are expressed by the one optative affix and that therefore number, time etc. likewise occupy the place of sādhyā with regard to the verbal bhāvanā. But such an assumption would be erroneous as number, time etc. are not fit to fill the place of the thing to be accomplished.—If the want of an instrument (of the verbal bhāvanā) arises, the place of such a one is filled by the knowledge of the optative form etc. The instrumentality of the optative does not lie in its producing the bhāvanā—for the latter exists in the word even before the knowledge (by some person) of the optative form—; but rather in the circumstance of the optative form expressing the bhāvanā or its tending to bring about the result to be effected by the verbal bhāvanā (which result as remarked above is the actual bhāvanā).—If finally the want of a mode (of the verbal bhāvanā) presents itself, the place of such a one is filled by the praise or glorification (of the acts of duty) which is found in the arthavāda-passages.

Actual (ārthī) bhāvanā is to be defined as the peculiar energy (of some person) which refers to some action (as f. i. a sacrifice) which energy is engendered by the desire of some object. This actual bhāvanā is—in words like yajeta—expressed by that element of the

word which denotes the verb; for the verb in general (independent of the different moods and tenses) expresses an energy.—This bhāvanā too requires three constituent elements, the matter which is to be accomplished,—the result; the means by which the result is effected—the instrument; and the mode in which the result is effected; according to the three questions (suggested by the actual bhāvanā as well as the verbal bhāvanā): what is to be effected? by what means is it to be effected? how is it to be effected? If the thing to be accomplished is asked for, results of the nature of paradise step in as the things to be accomplished; if the instrument is asked for, actions like the sacrifice present themselves as the instruments (by which the result is obtained); if the mode of action is asked for, all the subsidiary matters as f. i. the prayājas (which form a part of the sacrifice) present themselves and point out the mode of action.

If now the question is asked “what is the Veda”, we answer: sentences not produced by man. The Veda is fivefold, being either injunction (vidhi) or sacrificial formula (mantra) or name (nāmadheya) or prohibition (nishedha) or explanatory statement (arthavāda). That part of the Veda which intimates a thing not known (by other means) is called “Injunction.”

Injunction has a sense in consequence of its enjoining a matter having a certain purpose in as far as it enjoins the matter as not established by any other means of proof<sup>(1)</sup>; as f. i. the vedic passage “he who is desirous of paradise is to offer the agnihotra;” which injunction enjoins an oblation having for its purpose (the attaining of) paradise which is not settled by any other means of proof; so that the sense conveyed by the passage is “he is to realize paradise by means of the Agnihotra-oblation”. When on the other hand the (sacrificial) action is already settled by some other means of proof, an injunction merely enjoins some secondary matter (guṇa) with a view to that action. As is f. i. the case in the passage “he is to perform the oblation by means of sour milk.” Here, the oblation itself being already established by the injunction “he is to

(1) This appears a somewhat clumsy way of stating what is more clearly expressed in the following words of the Āpadevi: Sa cha vidhiḥ prayojanavadarthavidhānenārthavān sa chāprāptam artham vidhatte.

offer the Agnihotra", there is only enjoined sour milk with a view to the oblation (as the material to be used for the oblation); so that the sense is "he is to realize the oblation by means of sour milk."—Where both things are non-established (i. e. in the case of neither the sacrifice nor any secondary matter pertaining to the sacrifice being established by a previous injunction), the injunction enjoins something particularized (or specialized; *viśiṣṭa*); as f. i. in the injunction "he is to sacrifice by means of soma"; here, the soma as well (which is the material of the sacrifice) as the sacrifice itself not being established (by any other injunction), there takes place the injunction of that sacrifice which is particularized by soma (as its material).—Nor is it to be objected that (the passage being interpreted in the aforesaid manner) there takes place a split of the sentence (*vākyabheda*) the word "somena" enjoining two things; for there are not enjoined two separate things, but only one particularized thing (viz. that particular sacrifice for which soma is used).—Nor again is it to be objected that the passage "somena yajeta" merely enjoins soma as the material of that sacrifice which itself is already established by the other passage "he who is desirous of paradise is to sacrifice by means of the jyotishṭoma," so that the sense of the injunction would be "he is to realize the sacrifice (the jyotishṭoma) by means of soma"; it being pleaded for this interpretation that it allows us to dispense with the assumption of possessive indication (*matvartha-lakṣaṇā*; by which term is understood the denoting a thing by something else connected with it, as a quality etc.; as when the word "soma" is made to denote a sacrifice in which soma is used). For the passage referring to the jyotishṭoma is an injunction intimating a claim (*adhikāra-vidhi*) and this cannot be taken as an originative injunction (*utpatti-vidhi*; if the passage about the jyotishṭoma could be taken as the one containing the primary, original injunction of the soma-sacrifice, the passage "somena yajeta" might be taken as a *guṇa-vidhi* and thus "somena" would not have to be explained as meaning "somavatā yāgena; but as the purport of the passage about the jyotishṭoma is not simply to enjoin the soma-sacrifice but to intimate the claim which the sacrificer has to the fruit of the sacrifice, we are compelled to take "somena yajeta"

as the originative injunction of the soma-sacrifice and therefore to explain "somena" by "somavatā yāgena".—To this reasoning it might be objected that the passage about the jyotishṭoma may be taken as comprising an originative injunction as well as an injunction intimating a claim as this is avowedly the case with other passages as f. i. the passage "he who desires cattle is to sacrifice with the udbhid." But we answer: It is not so. In the apparently parallel case which you adduce (viz. the passage about the udbhid) we assume the double nature of the injunction because such an assumption is unavoidable, there being no other statement originative of the sacrifice (while in the case of the soma-sacrifice there are two injunctions; the instances are therefore not parallel).—And moreover if we explain the passage about the jyotishṭoma as containing two injunctions it would have to be taken as intimating the sacrifice itself and its connection with its fruit and this would be a manifest split of the sentence; better than which is the assumption of the passage enjoining something particularized (a sacrifice particularized by soma), by means of our attributing to the word soma the power of possessive indication.—

Injunction is of four different kinds, being either originative injunction (*utpattividhi*) or applicatory injunction (*viniyogavidhi*) or injunction of a claim (*adhikāraavidhi*) or injunction of performance (*prayogavidhi*).

That injunction which merely indicates the general nature of some action is called originative injunction as f. i. the passage "he is to offer the agnihotra-oblation". In injunctions of this kind the sacrificial action itself occupies the place of the instrument, so that the sense of the passage is "he is to realize the object of his desire by means of the agnihotra-oblation."—But, it may be objected, the two forms (aspects; *rūpa*) of a sacrifice are the material (offered) and the divinity (to whom the material is offered). How then can the passage "he is to offer the agnihotra-oblation", in which neither of these two forms is mentioned be considered an originative injunction, the word "agnihotra" (which seemingly indicates the divinity of the sacrifice viz. agni) being merely a name (and not indicating the divinity) according to the principle of (the existence of another scriptural passage) declaratory of it; (which

principle will be explained in the chapter on *nāmadheya*).—To this objection we reply : The passage is an originative injunction although neither of the two forms of the sacrifice is mentioned in it. Otherwise the passage “he is to perform the oblation by means of sour milk” would have to be considered as the originative injunction (of the *agnihotra*) as it contains a statement of one of the two forms (*viz.* the material) and then the passage “he is to offer the *agnihotra*-oblation” would be purposeless.

That injunction which intimates the connexion of some subsidiary matter with some principal matter is called applicatory injunction (showing how the subsidiary matter is to be applied to the principal matter). As *f. i.* the passage “he is to perform the oblation by means of sour milk” which enjoins the connexion, with the oblation, of sour milk the subsidiary position of which is intimated by the third case-affix (the case-affix of *dadhnā* showing that sour milk is to be used as an instrument and therefore is merely subsidiary to the action whose instrument it is). So that the sense of the passage is “he is to realize the oblation by means of sour milk”.—In injunctions of some secondary matter (*guṇa*) that which is expressed by the root (as “*juhoti*” in the above example) occupies the position of the object to be accomplished (so that “*juhoti*” is properly explained by “*homam bhāvayet*”—In an *utpatti-vidhi* and an *adhikāra-vidhi* on the other hand the root denotes the instrument; *agnihotram juhoti* = *agnihotra-homena iṣṭam bhāvayet*).

Sometimes the root expresses the abode of an action as *f. i.* “he is to perform the oblation for him, who is desirous of strength of the senses, by means of sour milk”; where the sense is “he is to realize strength of the senses by the instrumentality of sour milk”; and if now the question arises “wherein does it (the instrumentality of sour milk) reside?” the oblation which is mentioned close by steps in denoting the abode.

Injunctions of this kind are assisted by six means of proof, *viz.* direct statement (*śruti*); power (*liṅga*); sentence or syntactical connexion (*vākya*); interdependence (*prakaraṇa*); place or order (*sthāna*); name (*samākhyā*). Applicatory injunctions assisted by these six means of proof intimate subsidiary relation; the

subsidiary position of something consists in its being accomplished by the action of some agent engaged in the pursuit of some other result (so *f. i.* the *prayājas* are performed by a sacrificer offering the newmoon-sacrifice with a view to obtaining paradise); the same subsidiary position is expressed by the term “*pārārthya*” “existing for the purpose of something else.”

(We now proceed to a detailed discussion of the above mentioned six means of proof).

Direct statement (*śruti*; literally “text”) we define as irrespective or independent words (words which intimate their sense directly without any intermediate steps of the nature of those required by the other means of proof). Direct statement is of three different kinds being either injunctive (*vidhātrī*) or denotative (*abhidhātrī*) or applicative (*vinīyoktrī*). To the first class belong the direct statements contained in optative forms etc. (the optative form directly indicating the *bhāvanā*). To the second class belong statements as those about the rice-grains (*viz.* sentences like “*vrihín avahanti*” “*vrihín prokshati*” etc., where the word “rice-grains” directly produces the idea of the corresponding thing and its connexion with the *bhāvanā*). If finally from the mere hearing (the mere statement) of a word a connexion (between some primary and some subsidiary matter) is understood, we have an applicatory *śruti*.

*Śruti* of this latter kind is again threefold, being either direct statement by means of case-affixes or direct statement by means of one denotative word (or element of a word) or direct statement by means of one *pada* (in the restricted grammatical sense). Direct statement by means of case-affixes expresses the relation of a subsidiary, as *f. i.* in the passage “he is to sacrifice by means of rice grains” where by the direct statement of the third case-affix the subsidiary relation of the rice-grains to the sacrifice is expressed. This subsidiary relation is here brought about by the rice-grains forming the original substance out of which the cake is made (which latter stands in direct subsidiary relation to the sacrifice); in the same way as the animal (offered in the animal sacrifice) stands in subsidiary relation to the sacrifice in consequence of its being the original substance from which the parts actually offered

viz. the heart etc. are taken.—In the passage “he is to buy the soma by means of a tawny, one year old (cow)” the quality of being tawny is by the direct enunciation of the third case affix shown to stand in subsidiary relation to the act of buying; this subsidiary relation takes here place by (the quality’s) defining a substance viz. the cow, not directly; the latter not being possible on account of the immateriality of a mere quality.—Again in the passage “he sprinkles the rice-grains with water” the sprinkling stands in subsidiary relation to the rice-grains, as appears from the direct enunciation of the second case affix. And, it is to be observed, this sprinkling is not for the sake of the rice-grains considered in themselves as they would be perfect without the sprinkling, but has the purpose of bringing about the transcendental result (*apúrva*), which would not be brought about were the sacrifice performed without sprinkling the rice grains with water. In the same manner it is to be understood with reference to all subsidiaries that the subsidiary relation has the purpose of contributing towards bringing about the transcendental result.—Let us take another passage. “Thus I seized this bridle of the right; with these words he is to take hold of the bridle of the horse.” Here the direct enunciation of the second case affix shows the mantra to stand in a subsidiary relation to the bridle of the horse.<sup>(1)</sup>—Or another passage. “When he offers the oblation in the *áhavaniya*-fire.” Here the seventh case affix shows that the *áhavaniya* stands in auxiliary relation to the

(1) The above quoted example seems hardly to fall under the category of *śruti* but rather under *vākya*; which opinion as we see from the commentary was actually held by some teachers. The commentary says “some teachers maintain that the application (of the mantra to the action of taking the bridle of the horse) is founded on *vākya*. Others however object to this assumption and maintain that, in consequence of *liṅga* having greater force than *vākya*, *liṅga* would settle the mantra’s standing in subsidiary relation to a bridle in general before *vākya* could establish its exclusive relation to the bridle of the horse. Those however who suppose the application of the mantra to be founded on *vākya* defend their opinion by maintaining that the mantra does not point to a bridle in general but to the bridle of the right i. e. the horse which is an instrument to bring about the right and that therefore the mantra is to be applied to the taking of the horse’s bridle in consequence of the *vākya* “*āsvābhidhānim ādatte*” which is merely assisted by *liṅga*.—The author of the text (i. e. *Laugākṣhi-Bhāskara*) however does not admit that a *liṅga* in the mantra points to some peculiar kind of bridle (rather than to the bridle in general).

offering.—Thus in other cases too direct statement by means of case-affixes points out the proper application (of subsidiary matters).

(We now proceed to the two other kinds of *viniyoktrī śruti*). In the sentence “*paśunā yajeta*” “he is to sacrifice by means of an animal” direct statement by means of one denotative word points out the subsidiary relation in which singularity and masculinity stand to the *kāraka*; while again direct statement by means of one denotative word points out the subsidiary relation in which the number expressed by the verbal termination of “*yajeta*” stands to the *bhāvanā*. On the other hand direct statement by means of one *pada* points out that this number stands in subsidiary relation to the sacrificial action (for the sacrificial action as well as the singular number is expressed by the one *pada* “*yajeta*.”)

Nor is the following objection to be raised “how can the immaterial number stand in subsidiary relation to the *bhāvanā*?”; for this is possible in consequence of the number defining an agent. This agent again is to be supplied by inference. For the verb expresses the *bhāvanā* only; but the *bhāvanā* can not take place without an agent and therefore it leads to the inference of the latter.

Direct enunciation is stronger than suggestive power (*liṅga*) and the other proofs (by which one thing is shown to be subsidiary to another); for in cases where the subsidiary relation is established by suggestive power there is no verbal statement to be found which would directly teach the application (of a secondary matter to a primary one), but such a statement has to be formed (viz. from the sentence containing the *liṅga*); and in as far as in the latter case an applicatory injunction has to be assumed while in the case of direct enunciation such a one is already actually existing, the power of *liṅga* etc. which is founded on an assumption is set aside by the power of the direct enunciation. For this reason we do not conclude at once on the ground of suggestive power that a verse (apparently) addressed to Indra (i. e. a verse containing a mention of Indra’s name or one of his attributes etc.) is really to be used for addressing Indra; but rather decide if we find at the same time a direct enunciation as f. i. “with a verse bearing Indra’s mark he addresses the *Gārhapatya*” that in consequence of the direct enun-



ciation of the second case termination (*gárhapatyam*) the verse is subsidiary to the act of addressing the *Gárhapatya*-fire.<sup>(1)</sup>

Power residing in words (the power words possess to denote or point out something) is called *liṅga*. As it is said "the power of all words is named *liṅga*". By power the same thing is understood as by the technical term *rūḍhi* (conventional meaning; i. e. a word has the power of denoting that thing as whose name it has been settled by convention and tradition) and it can therefore not be said that *liṅga* does not differ from *samákhyá* (name); for *liṅga* which bases altogether on conventional meaning is different from name (*samákhyá*) which consists in words the meaning of which is to be made out from the meaning of their constituent parts. Therefore the mantra "I cut grass for the seat of the gods" can only be taken as being subsidiary to the cutting of *kuśa*-grass and not to the cutting of *ulapa*-grass and other kinds of grass, since from the power residing in the words "I cut etc." it appears that the mantra is able to declare the cutting of *kuśa*-grass only.<sup>(2)</sup>

In the same manner in other places too the application of a subsidiary matter is to be learned from suggestive power.

Power (*liṅga*) has greater force than syntactical connexion (*vákya*) and the following means of proof. Let us take for an example the following mantra "I make a pleasant seat for thee, I make it very lovely with a stream of ghee; on this, the immortal one, sit down, repose on it propitiously minded o marrow of the rice-grains". Here the first half of the mantra (I make a pleasant seat—ghee) is to be considered as subsidiary to the act of making

(1) The quoted *ṣik* is "sometimes thou art not hurtful, Indra, but comest to the worshipper" etc.; a verse which as mentioning Indra would be considered as connected with the worship of Indra, were it not for the direct statement referring it to the adoration of the *Gárhapatya*. The decision in favour of *śruti* as possessing greater force than *liṅga* rests on the principle that on the basis of *liṅga* an injunction may be constructed containing a direct statement (in the above case "aindrāmāntreṇa indram upatishṭheta"); that however a direct statement actually found in the text (*aindryá gárhapatyam upatishṭhata*) has greater force than one constructed.

(2) The example of *liṅga* given in the text does not come in very appropriately after the remark on the difference of *liṅga* and *samákhyá* as *samákhyá* has nothing whatever to do with it.—The passage is discussed as giving rise to a doubt in the *Mīm. Sūtr.*; but the doubt is whether words like *barhis* are to be taken in their *mukhya* (primary) sense only or also in their *gaṇa* (secondary) or derived sense.

a seat for the sacrificial cake, on account of the power of the words "I make a seat", and (the decision to what act the different parts of the mantra are subsidiary) is not to be made according to syntactical connexion (In the above mantra the two halves form one syntactical whole, the connexion being effected by the word "*tasmin*" (on this) beginning the second half. It might therefore be maintained that the whole undivided mantra is subsidiary to one act, either the making of a seat for the cake or the placing of the cake on the seat; or else that both acts are to be accompanied by the whole mantra. But here *liṅga* steps in and shows that one half belongs to the preparation of a seat and the other half to the placing of the cake).

By sentence or syntactical connexion (*vákya*) we understand common employment and by this term we understand the connected enunciation of two words denoting two things which in reality stand to each other in the relation of principal and subsidiary although this is not indicated by second case affixes etc. directly indicating the one of the two things to be the thing to be accomplished by the other etc. (which relations are directly indicated by *vi-bhakti-śruti* etc.) Take f. i. the passage "he whose sacrificial ladle is made of *parṇa*-wood hears no evil sound." Here we see from the connected enunciation of the quality of consisting of *parṇa*-wood and the ladle that the former stands in subsidiary relation to the latter. Nor is it to be said that the circumstance of being made of *parṇa*-wood is purposeless as the ladle could be made also in a different way (i. e. from some other kind of wood). For the word ladle intimates at the same time the peculiar transcendental result to be accomplished by it (by a ladle made of *parṇa*-wood). So that the sense of the passage is "By its being made of *parṇa*-wood he is to realize the peculiar transcendental result connected with the ladle, by means of carrying in it the oblation after it has been taken out of the vessel (by *avadána*). As it thus appears that if the ladle is made of *parṇa*-wood then the transcendental result to be brought about by it ensues and not in any other case the circumstance of its consisting of *parṇa*-wood is not purposeless.—The phrase "by means of carrying in it the oblation after it has been taken out of the vessel by *avadána*" (i. e. the

last clause of this phrase) is necessarily to be used as otherwise the quality of being made of parṇa-wood might be extended to sruva, srūk etc. also (for these implements also might be denoted by the word "juhú"—explained as a yaugika "húyate'nayá"—and in them also the oblation is carried, but not when it has been taken out of the vessel in the manner called avadāna).

This quality of the ladle of being made of parṇa-wood although it is given in the text in a detached rule (anārabhyādhīta; a rule which stands by itself, out of connexion with some particular sacrifice to which it might be referred; so that it must be considered as a general rule) is to be referred only to all the fundamental forms of the sacrifice (prakṛiti) not to their modifications (vikṛiti); for with regard to the latter it is already settled by an express rule (viz. by the general principle that a modification is to be performed in the same way as the fundamental form of which it is a modification) and thus there would be a useless repetition (if we directly referred the statement about the ladle having to be made of parṇa-wood to the modifications also).

A fundamental form of the sacrifice (prakṛiti) is that one where we find a set of direct rules extending over all the subsidiary things (requisite for the sacrifice). Of this nature is f. i. the darśapūrṇamāsa-sacrifice, in immediate connexion with which we find all the requisite subsidiary matters stated in the text.—A mere modification (vikṛiti) on the other hand is that form of sacrifice where there are no direct rules with regard to the subsidiary matters, as f. i. the oblation made to Sūrya (sauryam charum nirvapet); there some of the subsidiaries are settled (not by direct rules given for this special sacrifice but) by transfer (atideśa; by transferring or extending the rules given for the fundamental form to the modification). Detached injunctions are injunctions of general validity (while rules which are not detached but under the influence of some prakaraṇa refer to that particular sacrifice only with which the prakaraṇa connects them).

Syntactical connexion as a means of settling subsidiary relation is of greater weight than prakaraṇa and the rest. Thus f. i. with regard to the mantra (forming a part of the sūktavāka) "o Indrágnī you accepted this offering etc". This whole mantra is on ac-

count of its forming one syntactical whole to be taken as subsidiary to the newmoon-sacrifice only and not, on account of prakaraṇa, as subsidiary to the fullmoon-sacrifice as well. (The sūktavāka belongs by prakaraṇa to the darśa-sacrifice as well as to the pūrṇamāsa-sacrifice. It however contains mantras which by their līṅga are marked as belonging to either of these two sacrifices exclusively; so f. i. the mantra "indrāgnī idam havir ajushetām aviridhetām maho jyāyo'krātām" which by the word "indrāgnī" is shown not to be applicable to the pūrṇamāsa-sacrifice. It might however be maintained that it is sufficient to leave out the one word "indrāgnī" and that then the remainder of the mantra is to be used at the pūrṇamāsa-sacrifice too, with which it is connected by prakaraṇa. This opinion however is impugned by the Mīmāṃsists who maintain that the syntactical connexion binding "indrāgnī" to the remainder of the mantra is stronger than prakaraṇa and that consequently the whole mantra has to be left out at the pūrṇamāsa-sacrifice.)

Prakarāṇa means interdependence (ubhayakāṅkshā; mutual desire; mutual want of a complement). An example is afforded by the following passage connected with the prayājas "he is to offer the samidh". As in this passage no special fruit (of the offering) is mentioned, the sense merely being "he is to realize by means of offering the samidh", there arises the question "what (is he to realize)?" originating in the want of something to which the offering of the samidh might contribute. And again after the passage about the darśapūrṇamāsa-sacrifice has given rise to the idea "he is to realize paradise by means of the darśapūrṇamāsa" there arises the question "how (is he to realize paradise)?" originating in the want of something which may contribute towards bringing about the desired result. And thus by mutual interdependence the subsidiary relation in which the prayājas stand to the darśapūrṇamāsa is established.—This prakaraṇa is of two kinds, great prakaraṇa (mahāprakaraṇa) and included prakaraṇa (avāntara-prakaraṇa). By the former is to be understood that kind of prakaraṇa which refers to the principal bhāvanā (i. e. the energy productive of the fruit of the entire sacrificial action). This great prakaraṇa establishes f. i. the subsidiary relation in which the prayājas etc.

stand to the *darsapúrnamása*. Great *prakaraṇa* takes place with reference to the fundamental forms (*prakṛiti*) of the sacrifice only, as there only the relation of interdependence or mutual want is found (viz. if a fundamental form of the sacrifice is enjoined there arises at once the want of subsidiaries by means of which the sacrifice can be accomplished; at the same time statements regarding subsidiaries give rise to the question to what sacrifice these subsidiaries belong). The case is different with regard to the modifications (of the fundamental forms). For there, by the principle of transfer expressed in the words "a modification is to be carried out in the same manner as its fundamental form" the want of something indicating how the action is to be performed is already satisfied and it is therefore impossible that the proper application of the new subsidiaries<sup>(1)</sup> should be settled by interdependence (there being in this case no mutual want, but a want on one side only viz. on the side of the subsidiaries.) Therefore the application of the new subsidiaries is in the case of a modification settled by place (*sthāna*) only, not by *prakaraṇa*.—By included *prakaraṇa* is to be understood *prakaraṇa* connected with the creative energy belonging to the subsidiary parts of the sacrifice. Included *prakaraṇa* f. i. establishes the subsidiary relation in which the act of stepping forward (*abhikramana*) stands to the oblations called *prayājas*. *Prakaraṇa* of this kind is only known by the circumstance of an injunction being inserted in the middle of two others (*sandamśa*; the inserted injunction being grasped as it were by the two encompassing injunctions as by the two limbs of a pair of tongs). For if this peculiar position is not found all the subsidiaries mentioned (among them the stepping forward) would be taken as expressing the mode of action of the energy productive of the general result (of the sacrifice) and would then be subsidiary to the principal action (as the *prayājas* are). By the term *sandamśa* is to be understood the position of an injunction between two subsidiaries enjoined with reference to some one subsidiary. An example is furnished by the act of advancing (towards the *āhavanīya*; which forms a part of the sacrificial action of offering the *prayājas*). For

(1) *Apūrva* in this context means simply "new"; the subsidiaries which do not belong to the *prakṛiti* but to the *vikṛiti* only.

there at first a matter subsidiary to the *prayājas* is mentioned in the words "he is to pour (the butter) out of the *upabhr̥it* (into the *juhū*); for splendour etc."; (after that comes the passage "he for whom knowing this the *prayājas* are offered pushes his enemies out of these worlds; stepping forward he is to offer them for victory"); and after this passage again a matter subsidiary to the *prayājas* is enjoined in the words "he who knows the coupling of the *prayājas* etc". For this reason the stepping forward which is mentioned in the middle of two things subsidiary to the *prayājas* is to be considered as itself subsidiary to the latter.<sup>(1)</sup> For after the idea has arisen that a contribution towards the sacrifice is to be made by means of bringing about a transcendental result by the *prayājas*, there arises the question "how is the transcendental result to be brought about by means of the *prayājas*?" and this want of something teaching the mode of action is satisfied by the stepping forward etc. which actions are enjoined in the middle of matters subsidiary to the *prayājas*. Nor can the objection be raised that the productive energy connected with the subsidiaries does not stand in need of a mode of action being pointed out; for such a need actually exists this particular kind of productive energy participating in the general nature of productive energy.

*Prakaraṇa* directly teaches the application of actions only, and only by means of the latter the application of materials, qualities (which are connected with the actions). When f. i. with regard to the energy tending towards the realization of a certain fruit expressed in the passage "he who desires paradise is to sacrifice" the want of some mode how to bring about the result arises we have to take the set of actions which are mentioned in the sacred text in proximity to the above passage and with regard to which no fruit is mentioned (for if some special fruit were mentioned the set of actions could no longer be considered subsidiary to some other action); this set of actions which stands itself in need of something towards which it might contribute is to be connected with the above passage as indicating the mode of action.

(1) For a different argumentation with regard to the same passage see J. N. M. V. p. 100.—The practical issue of the decision is that only the person concerned with the *prayājas* has to step forward and not all those engaged in the *darsapúrnamása*.

That actions only can satisfy the want of the mode of procedure is a matter of common experience. For if with regard to sentences like "the hand is to cleave by means of the axe" the question is asked "how (is the cleaving performed)?", the proper answer does not lie in the word "hand" although enunciated, but rather in the raising and lowering of the axe, the sense being "he is to cleave by raising and lowering the axe by means of the hand"; and thus the hand is connected with the act of cleaving only by means of the raising and lowering as is known to every body.

Prakarāṇa has greater weight than position (sthāna) and the following means of proof. For this reason the acts like dicing etc. which are enjoined in the passage "he is to play at dice with a Rājanya" are, although they are read in the holy text in proximity to the abhishechaniya-ceremony and therefore would on the ground of position be subsidiary to the latter, in reality subsidiary to the rājasūya-sacrifice on the ground of prakarāṇa.

By position (sthāna) is to be understood equality of place. It is of two kinds, being either equality of place according to the text (pāthasādeśya) or equality of place according to the performance (anushṭhāna-sādeśya). The term "krama" (order of succession) has the same meaning as sthāna (position).

Equality of place according to the text again is of two different kinds, being either text according to number or else text according to proximity.

An example of text according to number is offered by the following passages "he spreads a cake on eleven potsherds to Indrāgni"; and "he spreads a cake on twelve potsherds to Viśvánara". With regard to these passages which are found in the text in the given order the application of the yājyā and anuvākya mantras (indrāgni rochanā divaḥ etc.) is settled according to "text according to number" i. e. the first mantra is applied to the first sacrificial action, the second mantra to the second action. For if with regard to the mantra read in the first place the question arises "to what purpose does it serve?", the sacrificial action enjoined in the first place presents itself first as they both occupy corresponding places. And so with regard to the second mantra also.—That things subsidiary to a modification, which things are enjoined with refer-

ence to subsidiaries of a fundamental form and stand in the middle of two injunctions, belong to the modification is to be concluded from "text according to proximity." So f. i. in the case of the oblations called āmanahomas (Taitt. S. II. 3. 9). For as with regard to them the want of something to which they may refer arises, the transcendental result consequent on a certain modified form of the sacrifice naturally connects itself as fruit (with these oblations), because this modified form readily presents itself (the modified form of the sacrifice which is mentioned in the holy text close by the āmana-homas is the kāmyeshti the originative injunction of which is contained in the words "vaiśvadevīm sāṃgrahaṇīm nirvaped grāmakāmaḥ").—If on the other hand (instead of the named oblations being considered subsidiary to a certain modification) an independent fruit were assumed for them (they being considered to produce a special apūrva of their own) their being mentioned in the sacred text in immediate proximity to some modified form would be purposeless.—

Equality of place according to the performance shows f. i. that the different details stated with regard to the sacrificial animal refer to the animal sacrificed to Agnīshomau; for the sacrifice of the animal offered to Agnīshomau is performed on the aupavasya day and on the same day (i. e. among the description of the ceremonies to be performed on that day) the details concerning the animal sacrifice are stated. And as now there arises the want of something towards which these details might contribute the transcendental result produced by the animal sacrifice which presents itself as something to be achieved naturally connects itself as that which is to be realized (by means of these details).—Position (sthāna) is of greater weight than samākhyā (name). For this reason the mantra about purification (śundhadhvaṃ daivyāya karmaṇe etc.) stands in subsidiary relation to the sūnāyya-vessel only as it is read in proximity to these vessels, and does not on account of the title "pauroḍāśikam" (i. e. referring to the sacrificial cake; the name of that chapter which treats of the offering of the sacrificial cake) stand in subsidiary relation to all the vessels connected with the sacrificial cake.

By "name" (samākhyā) are to be understood words the meaning of



which is found by decomposing them into their elements (yaugikah śabdah).—It is of two kinds belonging either to the language of the Veda or to common language. An example of the former kind is furnished by the vedic term “hotrichamasah”, from which we conclude that the hotṛi stands in subsidiary relation to the drinking of (the contents of) the cup called chamasa. (The term “chamasa” which has to be derived from the root cham “to sip” and signifies the cup from which the soma is drunk shows that the soma contained in the cup is to be drunk by the hotṛi; for which circumstance a more direct rule is not given). The word “ādhvaryava” on the other hand which belongs to common language points out that the adhvaryu stands in subsidiary relation to different things (mentioned in the ādhvaryava kāṇḍa).<sup>(1)</sup> This is a short statement of the power of samākhyā.

Thus we have shortly explained the six means of proof, direct enunciation etc., assisted by which injunctions of application—as f. i. he is to offer the darśapūrṇamāsa-sacrifice contributing towards it with the samidhs etc.—teach the proper application of subsidiary matters. These subsidiaries are of two kinds being either accomplished things or actions. By accomplished things we understand species (jāti), substances (dravya), numbers (samkhyā) etc.<sup>(2)</sup> All these have a visible purpose only. Subsidiary actions are again of two different kinds, being either secondary (gūṇakarma) or primary (pradhānakarma). These same two classes of actions are also called actions contributing (towards the general result of the sacrifice) through an intermediate step (sannipatyopakāraka) and actions contributing (towards the general result) immediately or directly (ārādupakāraka). By actions of the former kind we understand actions enjoined with reference to some substance etc. which latter is itself subsidiary to some other action. Of this kind are f. i. the beating of the rice-grains (in order to detach them from the husks), sprinkling with water etc. These actions

(1) By “common language” we have to understand the technical terms used by the yājñikas, in so far as they are not found in the text of the Veda itself.

(2) Species as f. i. the generic character of an animal which is offered as a sacrifice; substances like rice-grains etc.; number as f. i. the singularity, duality etc. of the things used for the sacrifice—All these contribute towards the accomplishment of the svarūpa, the outward form of the sacrifice.

are either such as have a seen effect or such as have an unseen effect or such as have a seen as well as an unseen effect. To the first class belongs f. i. the beating of the rice-grains (the effect of which is their being detached from the husks); to the second class belongs f. i. the sprinkling with water (which does not produce a visible effect on the rice-grains); to the third class belong (the actions referring to) the animal, the sacrificial cake etc., for these actions produce an unseen result in as far as they comprise the offering of a certain material (viz. the material offered in the sacrifice), while at the same time in as far as they are performed with regard to a certain divinity they produce a visible result viz. the remembrance of the divinity.<sup>(1)</sup> By an action contributing directly (ārādupakāraka) we understand an action which is merely enjoined, without reference to any substance etc. As f. i. the prayājas. Such actions are of use only in originating the highest transcendental result (paramāpūrva; the transcendental result produced by the sacrificial action in its totality); while the actions contributing through an intermediate step are of use also for the outward form of the sacrifice by means of their producing a modification (saṃskāra) of the material of the sacrifice and of the divinity (whereby they produce the so-called utpatty-apūrva).<sup>(2)</sup> The same kind of actions are also called inherent actions (āśrayi-karma; viz. inherent in some substance, divinity etc.).—Herewith we have given a short account of the injunctions of application.

Prayoga-vidhi, injunction of performance, is that injunction which intimates speediness of performance. This kind of injunction (is not a separate one, there being no passages which are merely prayogavidhi and nothing else but) consists simply in the injunction of the main sacrificial action (as f. i. “he who is desirous of paradise is to offer the darśapūrṇamāsa-sacrifice”)

(1) For the sacrifice is the parting with a certain substance (dravyatyāga) with a view to—or aiming at—a certain divinity (devatoddeśena).—Regarding the relation of the different kinds of actions to the apūrva cp. J. N. M. V. p. 57.

(2) On the different kinds of apūrva see—in addition to J. N. M. V. p. 57.—the instructive article अर्पण in Goldstücker's Sanskrit Dictionary. It is however hardly correct to render “apūrva”, as G. does, by “the unseen or transcendental power of a religious or sacrificial act which produces the desired result at another time etc.”; for apūrva is not the power of producing a result but a result itself.

which forms one syntactical whole with the sentences enjoining subsidiary things (the prayājas etc.); for this (injunction of the main action etc.) causing the execution of the main action with all its subsidiaries enjoins speediness of the performance which latter expression means as much as absence of delay (or pause), as there is no special means of proof for delay. Nor must it be objected that there also is no special means of proof for the absence of delay. For if (the things enjoined in the different injunctions were to be done) with delay, they could not be done connectedly (together; saha) and that they are to be done connectedly is understood from the circumstance of the injunctions referring to the chief action and its subsidiaries forming one syntactical whole. Just as we see that in common life two things which are done with delay (as f. i. the one thing to-day the other to-morrow) are never said to be done "together" (or "connectedly"). This absence of delay is obtained when a fixed order is followed; for otherwise there arise doubts regarding the order of consecution of the different actions and the whole performance is spoiled. Therefore an injunction of performance enjoins, for the purpose of bringing about speediness of the performance of what it enjoins, at the same time a fixed order which order is to be taken as a special attribute of the things enjoined (if it were not taken as a mere attribute of the things enjoined but as an independent thing the prayogavidhi would be open to the reproach of vākyabheda). For this reason "injunction of performance" is also defined as that injunction which teaches the order of the subsidiaries. By "order" (krama) we understand a particular kind of extension or rather (extension being applicable to coexistent things too) the relation of (different things) being earlier and later with regard to each other. For settling this order, of succession (of different actions) we have six means of proof, viz. direct enunciation (śruti), sense (artha), text (pāṭha), position (sthāna), principal matter (mukhya), procedure (prayjiti). By direct enunciation (śruti) we understand any passage whose purport it is to intimate order of succession. It is of two kinds, having either the purport of intimating merely order of succession or the purport of intimating something particulariz-

ed by order of succession. An example of the former kind is the passage "having prepared the veda he is to prepare the vedi"; this passage merely has the purport of intimating an order of succession; for the preparation of the vedi is already taught by another passage. (The śruti in the above quoted passage is contained in the suffix ktvā of kṛtvā—vedam kṛtvā vediṃ karoti. The passage contains the statement of the relative order of preparation of veda and vedi, in the way of anuvāda to those other passages which have the purpose of enjoining the preparation of the two mentioned things independent of their relative order in time). On the other hand the passage "the first draught belongs to the Vashaṭ-karṭri" has the purpose of enjoining a thing (viz. drinking) particularized by a certain order; for it can not be taken as enjoining order only with reference to the drinking because this would involve a break of the unity of syntactical construction. (The passage must be taken as containing information of a double nature as there is no other passage enjoining the act of drinking by the vashaṭ-karṭri. It might now be maintained that it enjoins two altogether different things, firstly the drinking, secondly the place of this act with regard to other acts. But as this assumption would involve vākyabheda, it is thought more proper to declare that the passage enjoins only one thing particularized by a second one.—Cp. the analogous case of "somena yajeta"). Direct enunciation has greater weight than the other means of proof, because the latter obtain their authority only by means of a direct statement founded on them being constructed. For this reason the cup devoted to the āśvinau is offered in the tenth place (among the cups offered during the Jyotisṭoma) because there is the direct statement "the cup for the Āśvinau is to be offered as the tenth"; although one might think that is to be offered as the third according to the order in which the cups are mentioned in the sacred text. (Starting from the aindra-vāyava graha we find the āśvina graha mentioned in the third place, Taitt. S. I. 4. 6; VI. 4. 9, so that according to pāṭha it ought to be offered in the third place; but the direct statement contained in the word "tenth" of the passage quoted above is stronger than pāṭha and settles the order of performance.—The

principle according to which the order of precedence of the different means of proof is determined in the case of krama is the same as the one followed in the case of the means of proof assisting viniyoga-vidhi. In the present example f. i. we might, on the ground of the áśvina graha being mentioned in the text in the third place, construct an injunction containing a śruti viz. "he is to offer the áśvina graha in the third place", the silent presumption being that such an arrangement would not be impossible, not against artha, which latter must be satisfied before we can pass from páṭha to śruti. But this constructed injunction would be met and invalidated by an injunction found ready in the holy text viz. "the cup for the áśvinau is offered in the tenth place".—That order of succession which is settled according to the demands of the purpose (for which different actions are performed) is called order according to the sense. As f. i. the relative order of the agnihotra-offering and the cooking of rice-gruel; to which actions the two passages "he is to offer the agnihotra" and "he is to cook the rice-gruel" refer. For as the rice-gruel serves the purpose of the agnihotra its cooking, according to the demands of the purpose, is to be accomplished first.—This order of succession according to the sense is stronger than order of succession according to the text. For if, the purpose as a means whereby to settle order of succession being set aside, the actions were performed according to the order of the text the cooking of the rice-gruel could merely have an unseen purpose, for if done after the oblation it could not serve any visible purpose. (But this would run counter to the general principle of never assuming an unseen purpose when a visible one can be established; hence the decision).—The order of succession of sentences which intimate certain things is called order of succession according to the text and according to it the order of succession of the things themselves is settled. For the sentences following upon each other in the text in a certain order produce when being read the ideas of the things (of which they treat) in the same order and according to the order of the ideas the order of the execution of the things is settled.—This text (páṭha) is twofold, text of the mantras and text of the Bráhmaṇa-passages. The order f. i.

which is settled for the cake offered to Agni and the cake offered to Agnishomau by means of the order in which the yágyá and anuvákya mantras are read in the text, is founded upon mantra-text. (The injunction referring to the agnīshomīya-cake is found in the second anuváka of the Taittirīya-bráhmaṇa, while the passage enjoining the ágneya cake occurs in the third anuváka. From this it might be concluded that at the fullmoon-sacrifice the agnīshomīya cake is to be offered before the ágneya cake. The order however of the mantras accompanying the two offerings, as found in the mantra-kāṇḍa, establishes the contrary.) Mantra-text is of greater weight than bráhmaṇa-text, because the mantra text is more intimately connected with the actual performance of the sacrifice than the bráhmaṇa-text. For the latter gives to understand that such and such a thing is to be done, outside of the sacrifice (during which the bráhmaṇa-text is not itself of actual use) and has thereby accomplished its purpose. The mantras on the other hand are actually employed at the time of the performance of the sacrifice the order of the performance depending on the order in which the single parts of the performance are remembered and as the order of remembrance again depends on the order of the mantras (whose property it is to remind one), the mantra-text forms an essential part of the performance of the sacrifice.—The order of succession of the prayájas which is derived from the order of the text of certain injunctions (viz. "he offers the samidhs" "he offers tanúnapát" etc.) is based on the order of the bráhmaṇa-text. For although the bráhmaṇa-passages may be said to have fulfilled their purpose by enjoining a certain thing, nevertheless—in the absence of some other passage pointing out the order of succession of the prayájas etc., the same bráhmaṇa-passages are to be accepted as pointing out the order of the succession as well.<sup>(1)</sup>—By "position" (sthána) is to be understood presentation, presenting one's self (upasthiti) for if at the place of something (as f. i. in the example given below at the place of the savaniya) something else is performed (as f. i. the ag-

(1) The commentary here takes a different view and maintains, as it appears rightly, that the order of succession of the prayájas is founded on mantra-text, not bráhmaṇa-text.

nishomiya and ánubandhya in the sacrifice called sádyaskra), that mentioned something (f. i. the savaniya) presents itself first after the thing by which it is regularly preceded (f. i. the áśvinagrahaṇa) has been performed and it is therefore proper that it should be performed first. For this reason in the soma-sacrifice called sádyaskra where the three animal sacrifices viz. the agnīshomiya, the savaniya and the ánubandhya have to be performed together (i. e. in immediate consecution) in the place of the savaniya (i. e. at that point of the sacrifice where in the fundamental form—the agnishtoma—the savaniya alone is offered) the savaniya animal has to be offered first, the two others afterwards, as in that place after the offering of the áśvina cup the savaniya first presents itself to the mind. For to the jyotiṣhtoma (of which the sádyaskra is a modification) belong three animal sacrifices, the agnīshomiya, the savaniya and the ánubandhya. These three have different places, the agnīshomiya being offered on the upavasatha-day, the savaniya at the time of the pressing of the soma and the ánubandhya at the end of the sacrifice. Sádyaskra now is the name of a particular somasacrifice which on account of its indefiniteness (i. e. on account of no special divinity being mentioned with regard to it) is to be considered as a mere modification of the jyotiṣhtoma. Therefore the three animal sacrifices are established for the sádyaskra also by the original injunction (which establishes them for the prakṛiti-form i. e. the agnishtoma and which has to be transferred to the different vikṛitis also). That there they have to be performed together (not on different days) is seen from the direct statement “he offers the animals together.” This common sacrifice of the three animals has to be performed at the place of the savaniya (i. e. at that point of the sacrifice where in the case of the agnishtoma the savaniya alone is offered) since that place is near to the principal sacrificial action (of all somasacrifices viz. the pressing of the soma) and since the fault of some of the animal sacrifices being removed from their proper places is the same, (on whatever day they may be performed together). For if the three sacrifices are performed at the place of the savaniya, only the agnīshomiya and the ánubandhya are removed from their proper places; while in the case of the three sacrifices being performed

either on the day of the agnīshomiya or on the day of the ánubandhya all three are removed from their proper places (for if they are performed on the day of the agnīshomiya paśu the latter itself can not be said to have its proper place as it thereby is removed from the pressing of the soma proximity to which becomes indispensable as soon as the injunction of all the three sacrifices having to be performed together is observed; the same reasoning if applied to the ánubandhya-paśu shows that the ánubandhya-day is not the proper one).<sup>(1)</sup> As we now read in the description of the fundamental form (of the sádyaskra i. e. the jyotiṣhtoma) “having done the áśvina cup and having tied round the sacrificial post with a thrice-twisted string he leads on the savaniya paśu” and thereby see that the sacrifice of the savaniya paśu is enjoined after the taking of the áśvina cup, the savaniya presents itself to the mind also in the sádyaskra immediately after the taking of the áśvina cup and thus, according to position (sthāna) it is proper that it should be performed first. The two other animal sacrifices have to be performed after the savaniya in the manner explained (viz. in the first páda of Adhy. V of the Mīmāṃsā, where the commentators state that the agnīshomiya has to precede the ánubandhya).—By order founded on the principal matter (mukhya) we understand the order of the subsidiary matters belonging to some performance in as far as it is settled by the order of the principal matters. For in whatever order the principal matters are performed in the same order the subsidiary matters belonging to them are performed, since in this manner all subsidiary matters are distant from the principal matters in the same degree. If on the contrary the subsidiary matters were performed in an inverse order (compared with the order of the principal matters) the consequence would be that some subsidiary matters would be

(1) For the details of the lengthy and unimportant discussion referring to the sthānatikramasāmya see the commentary on the Arthasamgraha in the lithographed Benares edition. (It is to be remarked that the text of the mūla of the passage is very incorrect in the lithographed edition a piece of the commentary having got mixed up with it).—In the Jain. N. M. V. the pradhānasomapratyāsatti is the only—and quite sufficient—reason for the three animals being sacrificed on the satya-day.—In Golstücker's edition of J. N. M. V. p. 224 l. 3 read ° हाभात् । तेषु



as near as possible to their principal matters and others again as far away as possible; and this would of course be improper, as it would interfere with the connectedness of actions intimated by the injunction of performance. Therefore the order of succession of the principal things determines the order of the subsidiaries as well. Thus f. i. a part of the (ghee which is the) remainder of the *prajā́yas* is at first poured over the oblation to *Agni* and after that another portion over the sour milk offered to *Indra*, because the sacrifice to *Agni* precedes in time the sacrifice to *Indra*. In this manner the two acts of pouring ghee are separated from the principal actions to which they belong; (viz. the offering of the two oblations) in the same manner viz. by one intervening act (1. pouring of ghee on the *ágneya* oblation 2. pouring of ghee on the *aindra* oblation 3. offering of the *ágneya* 4. offering of the *aindra*); while in the case of the reverse order being adopted for the pouring of ghee the pouring of ghee on the *ágneya* and the offering of the *ágneya* would follow on each other immediately and on the other hand the pouring of ghee on the *aindra* oblation and the offering of the *aindra* oblation would be separated from each other by two intervening acts (viz. the pouring of ghee on the *ágneya* and the offering of the *ágneya*); and this, as already remarked, would be improper. Order founded on the principal matter is weaker than order according to the text (*pāthakrama*); for the former determines the order (of the sacrificial acts) in a retarded manner only because it depends on the determination of the order of the principal actions which determination itself depends on some other means of proof. Order according to the text on the other hand is of a different kind as it merely depends on the order of the text as it is found in the *Veda*, which latter order is independent of anything else; it is therefore of greater weight.—On the other hand it is of greater authority than order founded on procedure (*pravṛitti*); for in the case of order founded on procedure many subsidiary matters are distant from the principal matter while they are near to it in the case of *mukhya krama* (about *pravṛitti-krama* see further on).

If in the case of several principal matters (or actions) being performed together and the subsidiary actions connected with

them having to be performed *seriatim*, the order of succession of the second, third etc. subsidiary actions is regulated according to the order of the subsidiary action performed first, that order of succession is called order according to procedure (*pravṛitti*). So f. i. in the case of the subsidiary actions connected with the animal sacrifices offered to *Prajāpati* (during the *vājapeya* where seventeen animals are offered to *Prajāpati*), with regard to which we read "having offered the *vaiśvadeva* oblation they proceed with the animals for *Prajāpati*". In this sentence the animals meant for *Prajāpati* are, as pointed out by the third case termination, enjoined, together with the actions constituting the mode of procedure, as having to be offered at one time. Consequently they (the sacrifices of the animals) as well as the subsidiary actions connected therewith as the leading on, the tying to the sacrificial post etc. (of the victims) have to be performed together (or connectedly, *saha*). This performing together becomes, with regard to (the actual sacrifice of) the *prajāpatya* animals, possible by performing the actual sacrifice (of all of them) at the same time as one divinity (viz. *Prajāpati*) is fixed (for all of them).<sup>(1)</sup> On the other hand it is impossible to perform all the subsidiary actions as the leading on, the tying to the sacrificial post etc. at the same time and the only method of performing them *together* is therefore to perform them in such a manner as to separate the subsidiary actions to the least possible degree from the principal actions. For this end one performs at first the leading on of one animal and after that the leading on of the second and follows the same order with regard to the tying to the post etc. And thus selecting from among the animals about to be offered to *Prajāpati* a certain one, one begins with it and performs the same subsidiary action with regard to all animals; after this one performs the second subsidiary action on the same animal on which the first one had been performed and again proceeds following the same order with regard to all other animals. The order of succession determined according to this principle is called order of succession according

(1) The Comm. remarks that another reading is "*sampratipannadevatākalatvena*", and that the time meant is the time after the performance of the *vaiśvadevī* while the divinity is *Prajāpati*.

to procedure. It is of less weight than order of succession founded on direct statement etc.—Herewith we have given a short account of injunction of performance by defining the six different kinds of order of succession.

By injunction of claim or qualification (*adhikāra**vidhi*) we understand that kind of injunction which intimates the ownership with regard to some result which is brought about by some action. By “ownership” we understand the position of one who enjoys the result.—To this class of injunctions belongs f. i. the passage “he who is desirous of paradise is to sacrifice”; which passage while it enjoins the sacrifice with regard to paradise intimates the state of enjoyment of the result consequent on the sacrificial action by him who is desirous of paradise.—Another example is the passage “he whose houses Agni should burn down after he has constructed the holy fires, is to offer to the merciful Agni a cake on eight potsherd.” This passage enjoining a certain sacrificial action on the occasion of a conflagration etc. intimates the ownership of him who acts on the mentioned occasion with regard to a result which consists in averting a calamity and which is produced by the sacrificial action.—In the same way the passage “he is daily to perform the *sandhyā*” intimates the ownership of him who leads a pure life, observing the proper times for all his duties, with regard to a fruit viz. the avoidance of disaster which ensues on the proper performance of the *sandhyā*.

This kind of ownership with regard to some result belongs to him only who is distinguished by the necessary qualification (*adhikāra*). By qualification we understand that which, in the passages containing injunctions, is mentioned as a distinguishing attribute of the person (whom the injunction concerns). This is, in the case of those sacrifices which are performed for the fulfillment of a certain wish, the wish for the particular result; in the case of the sacrifices performed on a special occasion the ascertainment of the occasion; in the case of acts of permanent obligation as f. i. the performance of the *sandhyā* the circumstance of the man leading a pure life and observing the proper times for all his duties. For this reason too the passage “a king who is desirous of the kingship of the heavenly world

is to perform the *rājasūya*-sacrifice” notwithstanding its enjoining (the *rājasūya*) with a view to the kingship of the heavenly world does not intimate that the enjoyment of the result will be obtained by any one who desires the kingship of the heavenly world, but only by him who being at the same time a king is desirous of the kingship of the heavenly world; for the passage contains a clear statement of the kingly dignity being a necessary attribute of the qualified person.—Sometimes a necessary attribute of the qualified person is to be understood although it may not be directly stated as an attribute of the person. This is the case f. i. with regard to the knowledge dependent on the injunction enforcing the study of the Veda. (This knowledge is a necessary qualification for any one who wishes to perform sacrifices,) since all the injunctions of sacrifices as they require a knowledge of the matters (used in the sacrifice) are given for those only who have acquired a knowledge of these matters in consequence of complying with the injunction inculcating the study of the Veda. In the same manner the quality of being provided with the sacred fires—which quality is obtained by the first construction of the fires—is a necessary qualification for all sacrificial acts which are to be effected by means of the holy fires; for as all these sacrifices can not be performed without the fires the injunctions prescribing them can be given for those only who by the construction of the fires have acquired the attribute of being owners of the sacred fires. In the same manner capability (to perform the duty is an understood qualification); for the injunction applies only to those who are capable (by bodily strength and health, mental power etc.) to carry it out, according to the principle expressed in the words “power (of understanding on the part of the hearer) co-operates with the verbs expressing a certain sense” (the verbs although possessing a certain sense have no effect on a person not able to understand it.)—Herewith we close the discussion of that part of the Veda which is denoted by the name “Injunction”.

“Mantras” serve to recall to memory the matters connected with the sacrificial performance. By this their property of recalling to memory the matters mentioned they have a purpose and it is not to be supposed that their enunciation merely tends to produce

some unseen result, as it would be improper to assume merely an unseen result while a visible result (in this case the circumstance of the performer of the sacrifice being reminded of certain things) exists. Nor can it be maintained that the recitation of the mantras is purposeless because the visible end of reminding one of certain things can be obtained by other means also (as f. i. by the bráhmaṇa-passages of the Veda which would point out the divinities etc. of the sacrifice even without being combined with the mantra-passages); for (the exclusive use of the mantras for the purpose) is founded on an injunction of a necessary arrangement (niyama-vidhi) according to which the mentioned matters are to be recalled to memory by means of the mantras only (not by any other means). By an injunction of necessary arrangement is to be understood an injunction which, in the case of one particular instrument being established (by some other means of proof) with regard to an action which can be performed by various instruments, establishes the use of some other instrument which is not yet established (by other means of proof). As it is said "An injunction takes place when something is absolutely non-established; an injunction of necessary arrangement when one alternative is already established; when both alternatives are already established, (the injunction required) is called limitation (parisamkhyá)." The sense of this passage is as follows.—That kind of injunction which establishes something not established by any other means of proof is called an injunction of something new (apúrva-vidhi) (or simply "injunction" as in the quoted śloka). Such an injunction is contained f. i. in the passage "he who is desirous of paradise is to sacrifice"; for it enjoins a sacrifice for the purpose of obtaining paradise which is not established by any other means of proof.—That kind of injunction which establishes something that is partially (i. e. on certain occasions) non-established is called an injunction of necessary arrangement (niyama-vidhi); as f. i. the passage "he is to beat the rice-grains." If it is asked how this passage can be said to establish something partially non-established, we answer: in the following manner. The passage does not intimate that the beating of the ricegrains has the effect of clearing them from the husks; (for a special passage intimating this would be altogether unnecessary)

as that circumstance is well known from positive and negative instances (it being a matter of common observation that the rice-grains if beaten are freed from their husks while the husks remain attached to the grains when the latter are not beaten). But the passage has the purpose of a niyama whereby is to be understood the supplying of a part (hitherto) non-established. For as the freeing of the grains from the husks can be effected by more than one means, one might leave aside the beating and begin to make use of some other means (f. i. of the finger-nails); for this case now the beating being non-established the above quoted injunction effects the supplying of the non-established part, viz. the injunction of the beating. Thus in a so-called injunction of niyama the purport of the sentence is a necessary arrangement which consists in a non-established part being supplied. And this (in the quoted example) means as much as the injunction of the partially non-established beating of the rice-grains.—That kind of injunction which has the purpose of excluding one of two alternatives both of which are established by some other means is called injunction of limitation (parisamkhyá-vidhi). As f. i. the passage "five animals from among the animals having five nails may be eaten (are lawful for food)" This passage has not the purpose of establishing the eating of animals having five nails (is therefore not an apúrva-vidhi), as their being used for food is already established (without any special rule) by the natural appetite of man. Nor has it the purpose of a necessary arrangement, as the eating of animals having five nails and the eating of animals not having five nails is established simultaneously (the two not excluding each other) and it can therefore not be said that the eating of animals having five nails is partially non-established. For these reasons the purpose of the passage must be to exclude the eating of animals not having five nails and it therefore is an injunction of limitation. Injunctions of this kind are of two different kinds, the limitation being either directly stated (śranta) or implied (lákṣhanika). An example of the former kind is afforded by the passage "for there only they sing"; for here the (directly enunciated) word "only" intimates the exclusion of all stotras except the pavamāna. An example of implied limitation is afforded by the mentioned

passage "five animals having five nails may be eaten"; for this passage does not contain any word which directly expresses the exclusion of other animals. For this reason merely implied limitation must be admitted to be affected with three different imperfections. These are firstly, setting aside of what is directly mentioned (in favour of something implied only), secondly assumption of something which is not directly stated and thirdly rejection of something already established (by other means). As is said in the śloka "on account of setting aside the matter directly stated and assuming a matter not directly stated and rejecting something established limitation is affected with three vices." (In the quoted passage the details of the three shortcomings are as follows). The thing directly stated which is to be set aside is the eating of animals with five nails. The matter not directly stated which is to be assumed is the exclusion of the eating of animals not having five nails. And the matter already established which is rejected is the eating of animals not having five nails (the means by which it is established being man's natural appetite). Two of these three imperfections lie merely in the words while the rejection of something established lies in the matter itself.

(Finally it must be remarked that) Those mantras which do not possess the power of reminding one of the things connected with the sacrificial performance must, since no other alternative is left, be assumed to contribute towards the unseen result by the mere circumstance of their being uttered and they are therefore not purposeless.

"Names" (as forming one of the constituent parts of the Veda) have a purpose by their defining (or limiting) the matter enjoined. So f. i. the word "udbhidá" in the passage "he who is desirous of cattle is to sacrifice with the udbhid (i. e. is to perform the sacrifice called udbhid)." In this passage the word "udbhid" is the name of a sacrifice and effects the limitation of the matter (the sacrifice) enjoined. This is to be understood as follows. The passage by pointing out a certain result enjoins a sacrifice not established elsewhere. As it does not enjoin sacrifices in general (that it does not do this is shown by the fact of a special result being mentioned) it must be assumed to enjoin a special sacrifice. If now the

question arises what special sacrifice is meant, we learn from the word "udbhid" that the sacrifice called udbhid is intended. Udbhidá taken as a name fits into the sentence by means of the relation of inhering in the same abode or coordination (sámánádhikarānya), the sense of the whole passage being "he is to realize cattle by means of udbhid the sacrifice" (in which sentence the two words "udbhidá" and "yágena" are coordinate).—That certain words found in the Veda have to be considered as names appears from one or the other of four reasons 1. from the danger of possessive indication 2. from the danger of split of the sentence 3. on account of another scriptural passage declaring it 4. on account of the comparison with it (for the details of which reasons see the following).

In the passage already quoted viz. "he who is desirous of cattle is to sacrifice with the udbhid" the word "udbhidá" must be assumed to be the name of a sacrifice on account of the danger of possessive indication. This appears from the following reasoning. (If udbhid did not denote a particular sacrifice, the only other alternative would be to assume that it denotes a certain instrument by means of which the sacrifice is performed; an explanation which might appear to be founded on the etymology of the word.—But then the following difficulties present themselves) in the first place it is not proper to suppose that the passage contains the injunction of the sacrifice with a view to the result and at the same time the injunction of some secondary matter (an instrument) with a view to the sacrifice; for this assumption would involve a split of the sentence (two different matters being enjoined in one sentence). In the second place (if somebody should propose an other explanation free from the mentioned defect) if the word "udbhidá" is supposed to express merely a secondary matter (an instrument) it would have to be said—as the sacrifice itself is not established by any other passage—that the passage enjoins a sacrificial action distinguished by a certain secondary matter, so that the sense would be "he is to realize cattle by means of a sacrifice distinguished by the udbhid." But in all such injunctions of sacrifices distinguished by some secondary matter the assumption of possessive indication has to be made, as already explained. (It is therefore preferable to take udbhid as the name of a certain sacrifice).



In the passage "he who is desirous of cattle is to sacrifice with the *chitrá*" *chitrá* is to be taken as denoting a certain sacrifice, because not doing so would entail a split of the sentence. For it would not be legitimate to assume that the passage enjoins a sacrifice distinguished by some secondary matter (on which assumption the sense would be "he is to realize cattle by means of a sacrifice connected with some secondary matter called *chitrá*"); for the secondary matter is already enjoined by another passage—viz. the one which runs "sour milk, honey, milk, ghee, grain, water, rice, all this mixed is offered to *Prajápati*"—and it is therefore impossible to consider the above passage as enjoining a sacrifice distinguished by the secondary matter (for the consequence of the latter assumption would be that the secondary matter is enjoined twice). And again if we assumed that the passage enjoins at the same time the connection of the fruit with the sacrifice and the connexion of the secondary matter with the sacrifice, the consequence would be a split of the sentence. For these reasons the word "*chitrá*" is to be considered as the name of a sacrifice and if we thus explain the passage as meaning "he is to realize cattle by means of the *chitrá*-sacrifice" no split of the sentence takes place as the word *chitrá* then fits into the sentence in the way of grammatical coordination. The name "*chitrá*" for the oblation in question is quite proper as it consists of various substances.

In the passage "he offers the *agnihotra*" the word "*agnihotra*" must be taken as the name of a sacrifice, on account of (another) scriptural passage declaring or establishing that viz. the secondary matter belonging to the sacrifice. But—somebody might ask—why should the passage not contain the injunction of a secondary matter?—We reply that this cannot be admitted. For if you should assume that the word *agnihotra* is a compound the first part of which has the sense of a locative so that it would mean that sacrifice in which an oblation is made into the fire and that therefore the passage enjoins the fire as a secondary matter viz. as the place of the oblation, we point out that such an injunction would be useless because the fire as the place of the oblation is already established by another passage viz. "when he offers the oblation in the *áhavanīya*."—If on the other hand you say that the compound is to be explained by

means of a dative viz. the sacrifice in which an oblation is made to Agni so that the passage would enjoin the divinity Agni as a secondary matter we reply that this too is inadmissible because the divinity of the sacrifice is already established by another passage. To the question what that passage is different answers are given. Some maintain that it is the following one "that he offers an oblation in the evening to Agni and *Prajápati*." Others say that Agni as the divinity of the oblation is established by the mantra "*Agni is light, light is Agni, sváhá.*" But—it might be remarked—if Agni is established by the mantra-text, he is refuted by *Prajápati* (i. e. to be set aside in favour of *Prajápati*) as the divinity of the sacrifice, according to the rule that a mantra has less power (to establish the divinity of a sacrifice) than a dative (such as in the former of the two passages quoted above establishes *Prajápati*). As it is said "a divinity is established either by a *taddhita*-formation or by a dative or by a mantra, the power of these three means of proof decreasing according to the order in which they are mentioned." To this we reply that the case lies differently. The passage "that in the evening he offers an oblation to Agni and *Prajápati*" does not merely enjoin *Prajápati* but makes an additional statement about Agni who is already established by the mantra ("Agni is light" etc.) and enjoins in addition to him *Prajápati*; thus, *Prajápati* not being enjoined alone, the passage does not refute Agni. —Nor can it be said that the passage contains an injunction of two divinities combined (instead of containing an "*anuváda*" with regard to one and an injunction of the other). For the explanation according to which the passage enjoins *Prajápati* only while it merely contains an additional statement referring to Agni already established by another passage is easier and more natural than the other one according to which it enjoins two divinities combined. —(To return to the general matter and to give another example of *námadheyatvam* being proved by *tatprakhyásāstra*). In the same manner the pieces of firewood called *samidh* and other things are established as the divinities of the *prayāja*-oblations by means of the mantras "the *samidhs* may partake of the butter etc." and therefore the words "*samidh*" etc. which occur in the injunctions "he sacrifices the *samidh*" etc. are to be taken as names of certain

sacrifices (not as denoting secondary matters) on account of another scriptural passage declaratory of it.

In the passage "he is to sacrifice attacking with the śyena" the word śyena is to be taken as the name of a sacrifice (and not as denoting the material of the sacrifice) on account of "the comparison with it (on account of the comparison of the sacrificial act with a falcon, which comparison is contained in an arthavāda-passage) as this comparison can not take place in any other way (but on the assumption of śyena denoting a certain sacrifice). This appears from the following reasoning. Whatever is enjoined (in an injunction) is glorified (in the corresponding arthavāda-passage). If now the injunction was meant to enjoin the falcon (as the material of the sacrifice), the arthavāda-passages would have to contain a praise of the falcon. But the arthavāda-passage "for as the falcon swooping down seizes his prey thus he (the sacrificer) swooping down seizes his hating enemy" can not be used as a praise of the falcon as it clearly effects the praise of something else by means of comparing it to a falcon. Nor can the falcon be praised by its being compared to itself, as in each comparison the quality of being that to which something is compared and the quality of being that which is compared to something reside in different things.—If on the contrary the passage enjoins a sacrifice named śyena then the arthavāda-passage is able to effect the praise of the sacrifice by comparing it to a falcon. Thus the word śyena must be taken as denoting a sacrifice on account of the "comparison with it."

(In addition to these four determining reasons which oblige us to explain certain words as names of sacrifices) Some assume a fifth-determining reason of this kind viz. the greater weight of the secondary matter as taught in the originative injunction (utpatti). As an example of this they quote the passage "he is to sacrifice with the vaiśvadeva" and declare that the word "vaiśvadeva" is to be taken as the name of a sacrifice and is not meant to enjoin the Viśve-devas as the divinities of the sacrifice, on account of the greater weight of the divinities Agni etc., which are already enjoined by the originative injunctions referring to this sacrifice (which are contained in the passage "āgneyaṃ aṣṭakapālaṃ nir-

vapati, saumyaṃ charuṃ etc").—But in reality (it is unnecessary to assume this fifth determining reason) as the circumstance of "vaiśvadeva" being a name already follows from the third of the four reasons detailed above. For with regard to the sacrifice under consideration there is found a statement, in the shape of an arthavāda which establishes the Viśvedevas as a secondary matter, viz. "that all the gods (viśvedevās) sacrificed together that is the viśve-deva-quality of the vaiśvadeva." (It therefore appears that the passage quoted above has not the purpose of pointing out the Viśvedevas as the divinity of the sacrifice and consequently the word "vaiśvadeva" is to be taken as a name).

By prohibition (nishedha) we understand sentences turning off man (from some action); for the purpose of sentences of prohibition lies exclusively in their effecting (man's) turning away from actions which would be the cause of some disadvantage. The details are as follows. In the same manner as an injunction conveying an instigation in order to give effect to its instigatory power intimates that the thing enjoined f. i. the sacrifice is the instrument for obtaining some desired result and thereby instigates the person towards it, in the same manner a prohibitory passage as f. i. "he is not to eat kalañja" conveying the idea of turning off (from some action) in order to give effect to its power of turning off intimates that the thing prohibited as f. i. the eating of kalañja is the instrument of bringing about some highly undesirable result and thereby turns man off from it. If it is now asked how a prohibitory sentence conveys the idea of turning off from something, we answer as follows. The sense of the word "not" is not connected with the sense of the root (of the verb in the prohibitory passage); for although the two words stand in immediate proximity the sense of the root presents itself as standing in subordinate relation to the actual creative energy (ārtī bhāvanā) which is expressed by the suffix (of words like bhakṣayet). For something which presents itself as standing in subordinate relation to one thing can not be connected with something else. Otherwise in the sentence "bring the king's man" (lit. the king-man, rāja-purusha) the king himself would enter into relation with the action (while in reality the king only stands in relation to his servant, the

latter in his turn being the object of the action expressed by "bring"). Therefore the sense of the word "not" stands in relation to the sense of the suffix only and here again not to the ártihí bhávaná which is expressed by that element (of the suffix) which denotes the verb—for the ártihí bhávaná presents itself as standing in subordinate relation to the instigation expressed by that element which denotes the optative—but to the verbal bhávaná denoted by the optative element of the suffix, the verbal bhávaná occupying the chief position of all. Thus the nature of the word "not" is to intimate the thing opposite to the thing with which it (the word "not") is logically connected. As in the sentence "the jar is not" the word "not" standing in connexion with the word "is" intimates the non-existence of the jar which is the opposite to the jar's existence, in the same way here (in prohibitory passages) the word "not" standing in connexion with the optative exclusively intimates the turning-off (from some action) which is the opposite to an instigation towards what is expressed by the optative. For as on hearing an injunctive sentence a person has the idea "that one (the speaker) instigates me", a person on hearing a prohibitory sentence has the conception of a turning off i. e. of an energy tending to produce in him (the hearer) a cessation of activity; which idea may be expressed in the sentence "he is turning me off." Therefore in the case of a prohibitory sentence the exclusive sense of the passage is a turning off.

Where there is however an obstacle in the way of the word "not" being connected with what is expressed by the verbal suffix, it is connected exclusively with what is expressed by the root itself. Such obstacles are of two kinds 1. the beginning with the phrase "his vowed observances are as follows" and 2. the contingent probability of a vikalpa (option).

An example of the former kind is f. i. found in the following passage "he is not to look at the rising Sun" as this sentence is read after a commencement has been made with the words "his vowed observances are as follows." For this reason a paryudása (not a pratishedha) is to be assumed here.<sup>(1)</sup> For as the word

(1) In the case of "not" being connected with the kriyá the sentence is called a pratishedha, while it is termed a paryudása if the "not" negatives a náman or the

"vrata" (vow or vowed observance) has the settled meaning of something which is to be done, the clause "his vowed observances are as follows" begins the enumeration of the vowed observances of the Snátaka as things to be done. If now the question arises "what are the things to be done?", sentences like "he is not to look at the rising sun" must be taken as intimating something to be done. Otherwise the syntactical unity of the former and latter sentences would be destroyed. Thus the sense of the verbal suffix is not to be considered as connected with the sense of the word "not", as in that case the passage could not be understood as expressing a thing to be done. For a "not" of that kind (i. e. a "not" connected with the sense of the verbal suffix) would express only a turning away (from some action) which is the contrary of the instigation conveyed by an injunction; and such a turning away does not express something to be done. Therefore in the sentence "he is not to look at the rising sun" the word "not" expresses by indication (lakṣhaṇá) the vow of not-looking which is the opposite of what is expressed by the root (in íksheta); for not-looking may be taken as something to be done. So that the whole sentence has to be explained as follows "he is to effect (bhávayet) by means of the resolution of not-looking which (resolution) has for its object the sun. And if it is asked "what is he to effect thereby?" the destruction of evil which is intimated by the complementary sentence "from so much sin he becomes separated" connects itself (with the bhávaná) as the thing to be effected. And in this manner the syntactical unity of the former and the latter sentences (which was spoken of above) is established.—Nor must here the objection be raised that there is no reason for the resolution of not-looking only being connected with the bhávaná as there are different other things which are opposite to the sense of the root; for these different other things are not things (or "the things") to be done and can therefore in the case under consideration not be connected with the bhávaná.<sup>(1)</sup>

dhátvartha; in which cases the "na" might be replaced by the "a" of a compound word as "abrahmaṇa.

(1) The commentary on this passage runs as follows: But as many things might be done contrary to the looking which is the sense of the root how is it that with regard

The second (kind of obstacle to the negative particle being connected with the verb) applies to passages as the following one "he is to say ye yajāmahe at (the beginning of) all yājyās, not at the anuyājas." For here too we must assume a prohibition of the kind called paryudāsa as otherwise there would be the probability of an option (optional procedure, vikalpa). The reason for this is as follows. If in the quoted passage the verbal suffix were connected with what is expressed by the particle "not", the mantra "ye yajāmahe" would be prohibited in the case of the anuyājas, the sense being "at the anuyājas he is not to say ye yajāmahe." But a prohibition (pratishedha) must be preceded by an establishment (by some means or other, of what is prohibited) as only a matter previously established can be prohibited. This establishment can only be found in the scriptural passage "he is to say ye yajāmahe at the yājyās" (for there is no other means by which the employment of this mantra could be established). But if something previously established by a scriptural passage is prohibited, (by another scriptural passage) only option (vikalpa) can take place and not complete sublation (bādha) (of the former passage by the latter) because the scriptural passage on which it (i. e. the employment of the mantra) bases is not capable of complete sublation by means of another scriptural passage as this is the case with passion forming the base of the establishment (of some act.—Passion may instigate a man to the murder of a Brāhmaṇa which latter act is therefore said to be established by passion; here however scriptural passages like "a brāhmaṇa is not to be killed" step in

to the quoted passage the resolution of not looking alone is accepted as capable of being the instrument of the bhāvanā?—The answer to this objection is: Although different other things as f. i. covering the eyes with a cloth might be considered as being the opposites of the looking which is the sense of the root, nevertheless, the sentence not conveying the idea of any particular energy of the body or of speech while at the same time mental activity is not prohibited, there is left only a particular mental energy viz., the resolution of not looking (as the instrument of the bhāvanā). The reason for this is given in the clause of the text "for these etc." Because these different other things as f. i. covering the eyes with a cloth can not be meant as that which is to be done, only something else opposite to the looking which is the sense of the root and extending to all actions is fit to be connected with the bhāvanā. For this reason the resolution of not looking which is opposite to the sense of the root is fit to be connected with the bhāvanā as it (viz. the resolution) extends to all actions.

and by their superior authority completely sublate the dictates of passion. On the other hand one scriptural passage can not completely sublate another as it has no claims to superior authority).—Nor must it be objected that as the general scriptural passage "the oblation is made into the āhavanīya-fire" is sublated by the special passage "he is to make the oblation on the foot-print", in the same way the passage "not at the anuyājas" sublates the preceding passage "he says ye yajāmahe at the yājyās"; for only such scriptural passages as are independent of each other stand in the relation of that which is sublated and that which sublates. For the quoted passage about the homa to be made on the footprint does not, in order to enjoin its purport, stand in need of the passage about the āhavanīya and is therefore independent. But in the case under consideration the prohibitory passage (na anuyājeshu) stands, in order that the thing to be prohibited may be established, in need of the preceding passage "he is to say the ye yajāmahe at the yājyās" and is therefore not independent. For this reason in the case of a thing enjoined by one scriptural passage being prohibited by another only option (vikalpa) is possible (and not complete sublation of one rule by another). But to assume option is not proper, because its consequence is the partial non-authoritativeness of scriptural passages. For if the ye-yajāmahe is employed with the anuyājas the authoritativeness of the clause "not with the anuyājas" is not upheld, in the same way as the authoritativeness of the passage enjoining the use of barley for the sacrifice is not upheld when the sacrifice is performed with rice. Moreover the assumption of vikalpa would involve the assumption of a double unseen result as the injunction as well as the prohibition are for the benefit of man (purushārtha.—The employment or non-employment of the ye-yajāmahe do not contribute anything towards the svarūpa of the sacrifice, are not kratvartha; an adṛiṣṭa has therefore to be assumed as the result of each). For these reasons the passage under consideration can not be explained as containing a pratishedha (where "not" negatives the verb) but we must consider "na" as connected with the word "anuyājas" and take the passage as a paryudāsa. So that the proper understanding of the sense of the passage is as follows "he is to use the



mantra ye-yajāmahe with the yājyās other than anuyājas", as the particle "na" conveys by indication the notion of (those yājyās) which are different from the anuyājas. And thus option has not to be admitted. And this sentence (i. e. the sentence constructed out of the words na anuyājeshu viz. "he is to use the ye-yajāmahe with the yājyās other than anuyājas") does not enjoin the use of the ye-yajāmahe as the latter is already established by the preceding clause, viz. "he is to use the ye-yajāmahe with the yājyās", but merely enjoins with reference to (as an anuvāda to) the ye-yajāmahe already established by a general text its (the ye-yajāmahe's) belonging to those yājyās which are other than anuyājas. So that the sense of the sentence is "the ye-yajāmahe which is uttered with the yājyās is to be uttered with those only which are other than anuyājas." But—it might be objected—according to the above explanation a paryudāsa-prohibition would not be different from a so-called upasamhāra whose purport is to restrict to some particular case something established by a scriptural passage of general application.—To this we reply that it is not so. For an upasamhāra has the purport of restricting to that only (i. e. to that which is mentioned in the upasamhāra-passage); as f. i. the fourfold division (of the sacrificial cake) which is established by the general text "he is to divide the cake into four parts" is restricted to the āgneya purodāsa exclusively by the special text "he is to divide the āgneya purodāsa into four parts." A paryudāsa on the other hand has the purport of restricting something generally established exclusively to what is different from the special thing (mentioned in the paryudāsa.) Thus it appears that paryudāsa and upasamhāra are different.—Sometimes, no other possibility being left, a simple pratishedha has to be accepted although thereby the probability of a vikalpa arises. Thus f. i. although from the prohibition of the taking of the shoḍaśin-cup which (prohibition) is established by the passage "at the atirātra he is not to take the shoḍaśin-cup" the probability of a vikalpa arises (i. e. the optional taking or not-taking of the shoḍaśin-cup at the atirātra), nevertheless the passage can not be taken as a paryudāsa (whereby option would be precluded) because this is impossible. For the following reasons. If the word "not" were connected

with the word "the shoḍaśin-cup", the sense of the passage would be "at the atirātra he is to take the cups other than the shoḍaśin"; but such an interpretation is impossible as it would be in open conflict with the express injunction contained in the other passage "at the atirātra he is to take the shoḍaśin." If on the other hand the word "not" were connected with the atirātra the sense of the passage would be "he is to take the shoḍaśin at the sacrifices other than the atirātra" and this explanation again is impossible as it would be in conflict with the injunction of the shoḍaśin (for the atirātra). For these reasons, no other possibility being left, the passage can only be explained as a prohibition of the taking of the shoḍaśin-cup which is established by another scriptural passage. And to this explanation it must not be objected that it involves a vikalpa, because a vikalpa too is to be acknowledged (under certain circumstances). The following difference (between the several cases where a pratishedha has to be acknowledged) is however to be noted. In the case of a pratishedha of one thing arising from vikalpa (in the case of one thing established by some scriptural passage being prohibited by some other scriptural passage enjoining the contrary) the thing prohibited is not the cause of any disadvantage (anartha) because in that case the injunction as well as the prohibition are merely for the sacrifice's sake (kratvartha; not purushārtha.—In the example given above the taking as well as the not taking of the shoḍaśin are kratvartha, contribute to the outward form of the sacrifice). On the other hand in those cases where there is no vikalpa and the establishment (of what is subsequently prohibited by a scriptural passage) bases on the natural passion of man only, and the prohibition is for the sake of man, there the thing prohibited is the cause of disadvantage as f. i. the eating of kalaṇja which is prohibited by the passage "he is not to eat kalaṇja"; for here only the prohibition of eating is for the sake of man.—Nor is it to be objected that in the same way a vikalpa would result from the prohibition of things established by scripture as giving, making offerings etc. which prohibition is contained in the passage "the man who has undergone initiation is not to give, not to make offerings etc."; for in this case although the prohibition of giving, offering etc. which things are of their own

nature for the purpose of man is not for the purpose of man the forbidden thing is the cause of disadvantage to man. The reason of this is that the prohibition of these things being for the purpose of the sacrifice they (i. e. giving, offering etc. if done by the dikshita) would destroy the power of the sacrifice. An analogous case is presented by the prohibition of approaching one's wife at the proper season (approaching one's wife at the ritu is generally enjoined but would in spite of that be a cause of disadvantage to the dikshita because it would destroy the efficacy of the sacrifice). (The result of which is that in the two last mentioned cases there is no opening for vikālpa).

Sentences whose purport is either praise (glorification) or blame are called arthavāda. Such sentences effect a matter with a purpose by indication (lakṣhaṇā; the sentences taken by themselves not being able to effect any purpose). For the arthavāda-sentences, there being no purpose in their conveying merely their own sense, by indication convey praise or blame of matters to be enjoined or prohibited, as they would be open to the reproach of purposelessness if their only object were (to convey) their own sense. (This latter statement is based on the sūtra I. 2. 1.) "on account of the (whole) veda referring to actions" (if the arthavāda-passages were taken as merely intimating their own sense without being connected with the passages expressive of injunctions and prohibitions they would be purposeless as the whole Veda avowedly refers to actions, things to be done. The arthavādas are therefore to be taken as containing praise or blame of the actions enjoined or prohibited in the vidhi-and nishedha-passages). Nor is it possible to assume purposelessness (of the arthavāda-passages), as the latter is rendered impossible by the arthavādas being comprised in the injunction of study contained in the passage "svādhyayo' dhyetavyah" which gives to understand that the whole Veda is to be studied and notifies the whole veda's effecting matters having a purpose.

Arthavāda-passages are of two different kinds being either complements of vidhi-passages or complements of nishedha-passages. Thus the passage "Vāyu indeed is the swiftest divinity etc."—which forms a complement of the injunctive passage "he who is desirous of prosperity is to offer a white animal to Vāyu

etc."—has the purpose of intimating a glorification of the matter enjoined. On the other hand the passage "he howled; that he howled (arodit) that is Rudra's Rudratva etc."—which forms a complement to the prohibitory passage "silver is not to be given on the sacrificial grass etc."—has a purpose by intimating the blameworthiness of the matter prohibited.—Nor must one raise the objection that the arthavāda-passages are (nevertheless) purposeless because the idea of praiseworthiness or blameworthiness is of no practical use. For these ideas have a decided use because they promote the activity of man who from laziness or other reasons does not set to work (to perform what is enjoined in the vidhi-passages.)

Again arthavāda is of three different kinds as it is said in the śloka "in case of contradiction it is guṇavāda; in case of asseveration it is anuvāda; in case of the absence of both it is bhūtārthavāda; thus arthavāda is of three different kinds." The sense of this śloka is as follows. An arthavāda is guṇavāda i. e. statement of some quality, if it contradicts some other means of proof. As f. i. the passage "Aditya (the sun) is yūpa (the sacrificial post)." There as the sameness of the yūpa and the sun is contradicted by perception, the passage establishes by indication (lakṣhaṇā) the quality (of the yūpa) being shining like the sun.—Arthavāda if conveying a sense already established by another means of proof is called anuvāda, reiterative statement. As f. i. the passage "Agni (the fire) is a remedy against cold"; for here the quality of fire being opposite to cold is already known from sensual perception.—A statement conveying something which is neither established by another means of proof nor in conflict with such a one is called a bhūtārthavāda, a statement regarding something which has happened. As f. i. the passage "Indra raised the thunderbolt against Vṛitra."

Thus we have established that the entire veda which consists of sentences like "he who is desirous of paradise is to sacrifice etc." immediately or mediately effects duty (dharma) consisting in sacrifices etc. Such (acts of) duty if done with a view to that (result) with a view to which they are enjoined are the cause of that particular result; if done with the intention of making of them an offering to God (īśvara) they are the cause of the highest beatitude.

Nor can it be said that there is no authority for performing such acts with the intention of making of them an offering to God; for the following passage of the Bhagavadgītā furnishes the required authority "whatever you do, whatever you eat, whatever you sacrifice, whatever you give, whatever you do in way of penance, Kaunteya, do it all as an offering to me." And the authoritativeness of Smṛiti is established in the pāda treating of Smṛiti ( I. 3. ) by the argument of its being based on Śruti.

---

For the easy understanding of young students the wise Bhāskara has composed this succinct compendium of the subjects treated in the Jaiminīya-Śāstra.

Herewith is finished the compendium of the Pūrva-Mīmāṃsā which is entitled "Artha-saṃgraha" and which was composed by Mahopādhyāya Laṅkāshi Bhāskara.

---

#### ADDITIONS AND CORRECTIONS.

Transl. p. 1. l. 22 : so that the beginning aphorism (i. e. the first aphorism of the Mīmāṃsā-darśana) means etc.

P. 6. l. 12 after "material" add : so that, by means of the possessive indication contained in the word soma, the sense of the sentence is "he is to effect the desired result by means of the sacrifice distinguished by soma."

P. 48. l. 10 : succinct.